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This paper analyzes capital market reactions to international bank M&A. We investigate 
combined  stock return patterns  of targets,  bidders,  and their  peers  upon  takeover  an-
nouncement, and closing or withdrawal. We distinguish five common M&A hypotheses 
and relate characteristic and mutually exclusive abnormal stock return patterns to each 
hypothesis.  We  find  that  investors  believe  in  gains  through  the  exploitation  of  market 
power by the post-merger entity. In a multinomial logistic model we show that patterns 
related to market power significantly concur with large relative target size, intra-industry 
mergers,  and  increasing  market  concentration,  suggesting  a  substantial  lessening  of 
competition through M&A. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the past years, the market for corporate control has changed global banking markets 
tremendously. Starting in the early 1990s, the consolidation within the international bank-
ing industry has been ever increasing, leading to a present state of highly concentrated 
markets with few dominating players. The mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions 
which led to this consolidation not only shifted billions of dollars back and forth but also 
changed the market values of the involved parties for better or worse. Responsible for 
those value changes are the shareholders of the target and bidder companies and their 
perception  of  the  deal:  is  it  economically  viable  and  will  the  combined  entity  benefit? 
Needless to say, corporate communication strategies try and “sell” the deal to the share-
holders. Looking at corporate press releases around mergers, the most frequently men-
tioned M&A rationale is the creation of synergies which will improve cash flows and en-
hance firm value. At least in theory, synergy creation seems to be a desirable M&A mo-
tive. However, empirical evidence shows that bank takeovers tend to destroy corporate 
value, at least when measured by short-term share price reactions of the combined entity 
upon deal announcement. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon: ei-
ther capital markets do not believe in materialization of synergies or investors perceive the 
alleged synergies as nonexistent. The fundamental question arises: Which M&A rationale 
do capital markets believe in? And consequently: How can this perceived deal motive be 
adequately measured?  
In this paper we focus our analysis on the question of whether or not shareholders believe 
in  merger gains through  market  power  exploitation. The  idea  behind  what  we  call  the 
“market power hypothesis” is simple. The merger of two banks in an already highly con-
centrated market can lead to oligopolistic market power. Especially due to the challenge of 
realizing economies of scale within the banking sector, we argue that shareholders might 
believe that a lessening of competition and increase in market power may be a good op-
portunity for banks to achieve relatively safe merger gains. General economic theory sug-
gests  that  higher  market  concentration  caused  by  the  ongoing  consolidation  of  global   - 2 - 
banking  markets  facilitates  anticompetitive  effects  (see,  e.g.,  Bester  (2007)).  The  hy-
pothesis  is  also  supported  by  an  industrial  organization  model  of  markets,  originally 
emerging from competition theory. In a Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods 
and switching costs–in which banks operate–takeovers result in increased individual mar-
ket power and uncoordinated price effects. Thus, target and bidder, as well as all other 
market participants, are able to demand higher prices and maximize their profits via ex-
ploitation of consumer surplus. Empirical support for our argumentation is provided by 
recent studies testing the relationship of market concentration and competition levels in 
the US and European banking markets. For example, Cetorelli et al. (2007), Casu and 
Girardone  (2006),  Beck  et  al. (2006),  De  Guevara  et  al.  (2005),  and Bikker  and  Haaf 
(2002) consistently show that over the past two decades international banking markets 
have been characterized by a significant increase in market concentration, going hand in 
hand  with  a  simultaneous  decrease  in  competition  levels.  Berger  and  Hannan  (1989), 
Berger (1995), Degryse and Ongena (2007), and Weinberg (2007) find significant and 
substantial price increases subsequent to M&A activities in the banking industry.  
The contribution of this paper is an analysis of whether or not capital markets, ex-ante, 
believe in the realization of market power effects.  We address this question with an em-
pirical study of stock return patterns. Since investors act upon the expected deal outcome, 
the combined abnormal stock return patterns of targets, bidders, and their peers reflect 
the actually perceived motive underlying an M&A transaction. We assume that varying 
deal motives should result in different share price reactions. We theoretically suggest a 
specific stock return pattern for the market power hypothesis. In an event study we inves-
tigate actual cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of targets, bidders, and their peers upon 
takeover announcement and deal closing or withdrawal. Our methodology measures the 
de  facto  net  effects  of  capital  market  reactions.  If  there  are  rivaling  opinions  on  what 
merger motive might prevail our methodology captures the dominating deal driver in terms 
of abnormal return magnitude, i.e., what the majority of investors think. To provide a thor-
ough analysis of investors’ perceptions of possible merger gains and to differentiate the 
“market power hypothesis” from other possible investor beliefs, we analyze four additional   - 3 -
M&A rationales frequently found in the relevant literature, providing possible explanations 
for share price reactions upon takeover announcements apart from market power. These 
are the merger wave, the pre-emptive merger, the financial distress, and the economies of 
scale and scope hypotheses. For all mentioned hypotheses we derive theoretical stock 
return patterns and empirically find that the market power stock return pattern actually is 
the most frequent among all patterns.  
In reality, there clearly exist more than the four M&A motives explicitly investigated in this 
paper. Further deal drivers include, but are not limited to, corporate strategy such as ex-
pansion (e.g., in terms of increasing market share or entry into new markets), geographi-
cal or industrial diversification, or (mis-)valuation. We do not investigate certain other mo-
tives since it is hardly possible to derive specific stock return patterns. Nevertheless, our 
results show all empirically observed patterns of our sample regardless of their corre-
sponding hypothesis, and, the results document the high persistence of our findings. Even 
though the merger wave, pre-emptive merger, market power, and the economies of scale 
and scope hypotheses have been analyzed in previous studies, this is the first paper to 
jointly test all four hypotheses and evaluate their relative ability to explain share price re-
actions in international bank M&A. 
Analyzing a sample of 600 bank M&A transactions within North America and Europe in 
the period from 1990 to 2008, we find that the CAR pattern derived from the market power 
hypothesis occurs by far with the highest frequency (10.8 percent of all deals) and, hence, 
seems to be most relevant in international bank M&A. The materialization of economic 
benefits  through  the  exploitation  of  market  power  as  a  consequence  of  M&A  seems 
unlikely, at least if their prevention is considered to be the primary aim of takeover super-
vision. The empirical fact that investors anticipate a lessening of competition through bank 
M&A, however, suggests a regulatory trade-off. That is, the creation and emergence of 
national champions to foster the economies’ credit supply and sustainable banking market 
stability is traded off with consumer protection in terms of competitive pricing. Thus, capi-
tal markets believe that takeover regulation tends to solve this trade-off in favor of strong   - 4 - 
players. Given the present financial crisis, this M&A supervision strategy seems question-
able at the very least. On the other hand, the merger wave (which occur in 3.2 percent), 
pre-emptive merger (4.8 percent), and synergy hypotheses (4.2 percent) play a minor role 
in international bank M&A. Financial distress, in contrast, seems to be of high relevance, 
occurring with an average relative frequency of 9.1 percent. Moreover, our descriptive 
statistics and corresponding significance levels are in line with previous literature. To vali-
date our findings, we use a multinomial logistic regression model testing the impact of 
deal- and firm-specific variables on the occurrence of the market power pattern relative to 
the other M&A hypotheses. Consistently, we show that our indication of market power 
effects significantly concurs with the fundamental characteristics of competition reduction 
such as large relative target size, intra-industry M&A, and an increased market concentra-
tion. We run a variety of robustness checks. We conduct our event study based on differ-
ent event windows and estimation methods. We investigate the underlying raw returns. 
We examine significant subsamples based on CAR confidence intervals. Furthermore, we 
generate bootstrapped samples to inspect the observed CAR pattern frequencies. 
Given these findings in the context of banks in the area of conflict between growth and 
profitability, our results are also interesting in terms of their economic and legal implica-
tions. If investors believe that bank M&A result in the exploitation of individual increases in 
market power by all market participants, and if post-takeover studies are able to show the 
existence of such anticompetitive effects, then lessening of competition may indeed be the 
predominant driving force for bank M&A. This brings regulatory policy into question and 
may even warrant more stringent takeover supervision, especially given the regulators’ 
trade-off between national banking champions and competitive pricing in the light of the 
current  financial  crisis.  These  results  suggest  future  research,  investigating  the  actual 
economic relevance of market power effects in terms of welfare effects within the banking 
market and, if applicable, developing and analyzing suitable regulatory responses. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant M&A litera-
ture,  explains  essential  takeover  theories,  and  derives  our  hypotheses  and  research   - 5 -
model. Section 3 outlines our data set and provides the corresponding descriptive statis-
tics. Section 4 highlights our research methodology and related test statistics. Our empiri-
cal results, including the multinomial logistic regression model and corresponding robust-
ness checks, are presented in section 5, and our findings and conclusion are in section 6. 
2.  Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
Empirical  research  on  the  background,  conduct,  and  outcome  of  M&A  transactions 
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Seminal research using event study method-
ology includes the work of Dodd and Ruback (1977), Dodd (1980), and Asquith (1983), 
who analyze the abnormal stock returns of targets and bidders upon takeover announce-
ment and deal closing. Bradley et al. (1983) and Davidson et al. (1989) focus on the ab-
normal returns of targets and bidders involved in withdrawn M&A. Consistently, all authors 
conclude  that takeover bids  result  in  positive  abnormal  returns for  targets  and  slightly 
negative abnormal returns for bidders. Although cancellation is bad news in the short run, 
targets are able to retain higher valuation in the long run (Bradley et al. (1983)). Holl et al. 
(1997)  investigate  intra-  and  inter-industry  M&A  and  find  that  vertical  takeovers  yield 
higher returns than horizontal mergers. Hviid and Prendergast (1993) and Dassiou and 
Holl (1996) analyze long-term M&A effects and show that withdrawn acquisitions increase 
the profitability of targets but decrease the return of failed bidders. Moreover, Stulz (1988) 
and Stulz et al. (1990) show that target takeover returns are increasing in managerial eq-
uity ownership, but larger managerial shareholdings at the same time decrease the occur-
rence probability of tender offers. 
Most relevant for our paper are studies focusing on bank M&A. Houston and Ryngaert 
(1994) analyze the merger gains of target and bidder banks and identify deal characteris-
tics that are value-enhancing as perceived by capital markets. Although they only find 
slightly  positive  and  statistically  insignificant  takeover  gains,  they  are  able  to  identify 
value-increasing deal characteristics, such as bidder profitability or merger synergies. Pil-
loff and Santomero (1996) provide a detailed literature overview of different types of eco-
nomic merger gains. More recent papers on bank M&A include Beitel et al. (2004) and   - 6 - 
Lorenz and Schiereck (2007). Beitel et al. (2004) analyze the drivers of abnormal target 
and bidder returns in European bank M&A and identify a set of variables explaining ex-
cess  returns.  Lorenz  and  Schiereck  (2007)  test  abnormal  target  and  bidder  returns  in 
withdrawn bank M&A and support the findings of Dodd and Ruback (1977), Dodd (1980), 
and Asquith (1983): Failed bidders experience negative value impacts, while targets profit 
from a sustainably positive revaluation. 
Most of the existing analyses were conducted by investigating either target and bidder 
returns, or the share price reactions of their peers upon deal announcement or withdrawal. 
However, none of these studies quantitatively compared the different hypotheses, either 
by mutually analyzing target, bidder and peer returns or by testing the hypotheses against 
one another. So, even though the market power hypothesis as  well as the controlling 
theories  of  merger  wave,  pre-emptive  merger, market  power,  economies  of  scale  and 
scope hypotheses and financial distress have been analyzed in previous studies, this is 
the first paper to jointly test all five hypotheses and evaluate their relative ability to explain 
share price reactions in international bank M&A. Therefore, in contrast to other studies, 
we do not restrict ourselves to just the transaction parties, their peers, or the outcome of 
the respective M&A transaction. Since it is our aim to compare and jointly test the empiri-
cal relevance of the theories, we need the most comprehensive view of M&A possible. We 
therefore analyze the CARs of all relevant players: targets, bidders, and their five respec-
tive closest peers upon the events of takeover announcement (Event 1) and deal closing 
(Event 2a) or withdrawal (Event 2b) as illustrated in Figure 1. Although the deal closing 
event might have lower information content than a withdrawal, it still discloses valuable 
news. Since every announced takeover has a positive withdrawal probability, the closing 
takes away this uncertainty and finally guarantees the deal’s materialization. 
However, since all five hypotheses imply divergent M&A motives, and thus different eco-
nomic consequences, we regard it as necessary to analyze which of them best explains 
deal drivers as perceived by capital markets. Hence, we contribute to the existing litera-
ture and academic discussion in three ways: First, this is the only paper to present a com-  - 7 -
prehensive  research  approach  analyzing  all  CARs  of targets,  bidders, and  their  peers 
upon the events of takeover announcement and deal closing or withdrawal. Second, we 
offer the first empirical comparison of the hypotheses. Third, we apply standardized event 
study methodology based on combined CAR patterns paired with a multinomial logistic 
regression approach to jointly test the empirical relevance of each M&A hypothesis.   - 8 - 
Figure 1: M&A Decision Tree 
This figure shows the decision tree of M&A transactions. In contrast to other studies we do not restrict our 
research to the transaction parties, their peers, or the actual deal outcome. We analyze the CARs of all rele-
vant players: targets, bidders, and their five respective closest peers upon the events of takeover announce-
ment (Event 1) and deal closing (Event 2a) or withdrawal (Event 2b). This comprehensive research approach 
investigating all relevant CARs upon all possible M&A events differentiates our paper from existing studies 
and highlights our contribution to the academic discussion. 
 
 
Announcement (Event 1) 
- Acquirer 
- Target 
- Acquirer Peers 
- Target Peers 
Closing (Event 2a) 
- Acquirer 
- Target 
- Acquirer Peers 
- Target Peers 
Withdrawal (Event 2b) 
- Acquirer 
- Target 
- Acquirer Peers 
- Target Peers 
t1  t0  time   - 9 -
Before we highlight the M&A hypotheses, we will briefly discuss the underlying market 
structure and demarcation as well as the regulatory framework of the banking industry. 
We assume the global banking market to be characterized by price competition, hetero-
geneous goods, switching costs, and imperfect competition. Thus, the banking industry 
may best be illustrated through a combination of Bertrand’s price competition given het-
erogeneous  goods  and  Klemperer’s  switching  cost  model  (see  Klemperer  (1987a), 
(1987b), and (1995)). Within this theoretical framework we assume switching costs to turn 
homogeneous banking services into heterogeneous services: by imposing services with 
switching costs, banking services become not interchangeable. This assumption is espe-
cially important for the Bertrand competition model and the setting of unilateral prices fol-
lowing a merger, as explained below. The specification of the banking market structure is 
relevant to derive the expected CAR signs for targets, bidders, and peers within the pre-
emptive merger, market power and economies of scale and scope hypotheses. The same 
holds true for the market definition, because it is the basis of our peer selection. In this 
respect, it is essential to determine whether the banking sector is better defined as a na-
tional or as a continental market. In our view, the banking industry as a whole is a mixture 
of both. While some sub-industries, especially retail banking, are national markets, others, 
like  investment  banking,  are  clearly  continental  markets.  Thus,  we  define  the  banking 
market based on its individual sub-industries. Finally, regulation plays an important role. 
Here, one needs to differentiate between specific M&A supervision by antitrust agencies 
and  general  banking  market  regulation  by  financial  regulatory  authorities.  In  terms  of 
takeover supervision, the banking sector is quite comparable with any other industry, ex-
cept for the special emphasis on financial market stability. This specific feature results in a 
severe regulatory trade-off for antitrust authorities. That is, the antitrust agencies must 
choose between either creating strong national banking champions to ensure credit sup-
ply and foster sustainable financial stability, or protecting consumers by enforcing com-
petitive  market  pricing.  Nevertheless,  even  though  antitrust  authorities  often  solve  this 
trade-off in favor of strong players, allowing for price increases subsequent to bank M&A, 
their aspired aim of sustainable market stability in the current financial crisis seems out of   - 10 - 
reach.  However,  regarding general market regulation  the  banking  sector  is  one  of  the 
most regulated industries in the world (e.g., see Bhattacharya et al. (2002)). 
Market Power Hypothesis 
As our main motive, we introduce the market power hypothesis which is based on anti-
competitive effects resulting from M&A activity. Such externalities due to takeovers have 
always been in focus by antitrust authorities because in the banking industry they, e.g., 
may  result  in  a  more  restrictive  lending  behavior  (see,  e.g.,  Berger  et  al.  (1998)  and 
(2001)). This hypothesis is based on industrial organization and originally goes back to 
competition theory. Our hypothesis argues that in a Bertrand oligopoly with heterogene-
ous goods, takeovers will result in a lessening of competition and increased market prices 
(see, e.g., Werden (2006)). Due to higher market concentration and, hence, increased 
individual market power, targets, bidders, and their competitors are able to demand higher 
prices, thereby maximizing their profits by exploiting consumer surplus. We specifically 
refer to the existence of so called unilateral effects in terms of uncoordinated price in-
creases. Hence a merger of two firms operating in an oligopoly under Bertrand competi-
tion will result in a higher equilibrium price than under perfect competition. Based on this 
logic, striving for market power is a desirable M&A motive, since every takeover reduces 
the number of players and narrows competition. So, within this framework, the predomi-
nant intention of a bidder is to acquire one of its direct competitors and, thereby, facilitate 
unilateral (price) effects (for a theoretical merger-model with positive (and negative) exter-
nalities see Croson et al. (2004)). Added value is created by extracting consumer rent, 
whereas  operating  synergies  play  no  substantial  role.  Consistently,  positive  abnormal 
peer returns are the consequence of anticompetitive takeover effects. 
Even though such uncoordinated price increases, per definition, do not go hand in hand 
with explicit collusion, at least the possibility of implicit collusive behavior among market 
participants cannot be neglected ex-ante. Moreover, collusion would yield identical share 
price reactions for targets, bidders, and their peers and, therefore, result in the same ex-
pected CAR patterns as unilateral effects. Nevertheless, several authors like Eckbo (1983   - 11 -
and 1985), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), and Stillman (1983) empirically reject the materi-
alization of the collusion theory subsequent to M&A transactions. The existence of unilat-
eral effects, however, is supported by Berger and Hannan (1989), Berger (1995), Hannan 
and Berger (1991), Degryse and Ongena (2007), and Weinberg (2007), who show that 
higher market concentration triggers price increases. Consistently, all authors conclude 
that bank M&A ultimately result in unilateral effects and, thus, in a lessening of competi-
tion. 
Based on this reasoning, we expect that targets and bidders will consistently show posi-
tive abnormal returns at M&A announcement (event 1). While target shareholders profit 
from the takeover premium, bidders benefit from an increased market power due to the 
acquisition. We  implicitly  assume  that  possible  negative  short-term  effects for  bidders, 
such as excessive takeover premiums, are dominated by the positive long-term effects of 
sustainable price increases.  Furthermore, we anticipate that target and bidder peers will 
have positive abnormal returns, since unilateral effects are facilitated. According to the 
market power hypothesis, all market participants profit from M&A because a lower number 
of players decreases competition and boosts future profits. 
If the deal is successfully closed (event2a), we predict exactly the same abnormal returns 
for all parties as on announcement. In contrast, we expect a withdrawn deal (event 2b) to 
result in the opposite outcome. In this case, targets, bidders, and peers should persis-
tently show negative CARs. While target shareholders lose takeover premiums, bidders 
forego the opportunity to increase their market power and extract additional consumer 
surplus via price increases. Due to the failed deal, the number of market participants re-
mains constant and unilateral price effects cannot materialize. 
We anticipate the market power hypothesis to coincide with deals characterized by a large 
target size, since a noticeable shift in market shares is the basic prerequisite for such 
anticompetitive takeover effects. Moreover, as targets and bidders are supposed to oper-
ate  within  the  same  sub-industry,  we  also  expect  the  hypothesis  to  concur  with  intra-
industry M&A and a substantial increase in corresponding market concentration subse-  - 12 - 
quent to the respective transactions. 
Merger Wave Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis against which we compare our main hypothesis, the market power 
hypothesis, is the merger wave hypothesis. We include this theory to control for M&A 
deals which take place in a merger wave and are thus not the result of strict economic 
rationale. The idea behind this merger rationale is based on the acquisition probability 
hypothesis of Song and Walkling (2000) and Otchere and Ip (2006), which explains M&A 
as a trend phenomenon. Based on the existence of merger waves, they state that man-
agements’ motivation to engage in a transaction is not based on economically viable rea-
sons (such as synergies) but rather on a herding pressure. The intuitive explanation is that 
management might feel the need to react to other corporate transactions in a given indus-
try by engaging in a merger itself, regardless of whether or not this deal is beneficial for 
the company. In their theory, Song and Walkling conclude that the positive abnormal re-
turns of target rivals are driven by an increased takeover probability within the market. 
Consequently, the acquisition probability hypothesis states that any unexpected takeover 
signals the potential for further mergers and, thus, triggers subsequent M&A activities. 
Carrying  this  logic  to  the  extreme,  the  increased  takeover  probability  can  result  in  a 
merger wave.  
Following the notion of this theory we assume that in a “hot” M&A market shareholders 
anticipate that their company will be target in a future deal. Targets generally benefit from 
M&A transactions, becoming a target is therefore desirable. As the probability that their 
company will be involved in a deal increases with every completed transaction, the market 
–  especially  a  company’s  peers  –  react  positively  to  merger  announcements.  For  the 
peers, the rationale is thus strictly forward looking: in a merger wave, shareholders of peer 
companies do not react on the specifics of a deal itself but rather on the increasing prob-
ability of a deal involvement of their company. The stock reactions should thus be positive 
upon announcement (event 1), positive upon deal closing (event 2a) and negative upon 
deal withdrawal (event 2b). Target shareholders react accordingly: since they want their   - 13 -
companies to be targets in a deal, the stock reaction upon becoming a target is expected 
to be positive. Following this logic, the contrary holds true for the bidders upon deal an-
nouncement. Bidder shareholders have to face the realities of a deal: possible overpay-
ment (especially in a “hot” market), high costs in the realization of synergies in the post-
merger period, lack of economic viability of the deal as well as the fact that the chance of 
being the target in a deal is foregone. We thus believe the stock reaction to be negative 
upon deal announcement, negative upon deal closing and positive on withdrawal. For the 
involved party, the rationale is therefore not forward looking anymore, but deal related. 
Pre-emptive Merger Hypothesis 
As our second comparative hypothesis, we highlight the theory of pre-emptive mergers as 
a possible transaction motive. A pre-emptive merger is characterized by a bidder who 
wants to prevent its main competitors from acquiring their preferred targets in order to 
protect its own market position. Consistent with this hypothesis, pre-emptive mergers are 
not driven by the idea of value creation but are rather considered to limit possible expo-
sure due to a deteriorating competitive position. This implies that pre-emptive mergers are 
value-diminishing  transactions.  Deneckere  and  Davidson  (1985),  Kwoka  (1989),  Ziss 
(2001), and Brito (2003) analyze this issue and find similar results. Brito (2003) concludes 
that firms engage in M&A to protect their competitive position even though the takeover 
does not promise any direct benefits. Some of those transactions even might be rushed-
into as to prevent competitors from the acquisition; which Croson et al. (2004) show in 
their model in the presence of negative external effects. Hence, although the takeover 
itself is disadvantageous for the bidder, it is still the lesser of two evils. A similar outcome 
is also shown by Margsiri et al. (2008) who derive announcement returns of the acquirer’s 
alternative option of internal growth. Accordingly, a fraction of the bidder’s market value is 
the value of internal growth opportunities. Once a takeover is announced, investors re-
value these opportunities resulting in negative CARs. Based on this reasoning, we include 
this theory to control for M&A deals in which a company might have been forced into and 
in which the preemption is the dominant deal driver.   - 14 - 
Based on the framework of the pre-emptive merger hypothesis, we anticipate the following 
abnormal returns: At M&A announcement (event 1), target shares should show positive 
abnormal returns due to the takeover premium. However, abnormal bidder returns should 
be negative, since the transaction is motivated by the intention to reduce future losses due 
to a deteriorating market position and, thus, provides a negative outlook. Target peers 
should be characterized by positive abnormal returns because, after the most desirable 
target has been acquired, they might be the focus of forthcoming transactions themselves. 
We expect bidder peers to show negative abnormal returns, since their preferred target 
has been taken over by a direct competitor and, hence, promising synergies are forgone. 
If the deal is closed (event 2a), we predict exactly the same share price reactions for all 
parties as at M&A announcement. However, in the case of deal cancellation (event 2b), 
the anticipated outcome and the underlying storyline change. Here, we expect targets as 
well as bidders to consistently show negative CARs. The reasoning is that target share-
holders lose the offer premium, whereas bidders forego the opportunity of a pre-emptive 
merger. Thus, the threat of a direct competitor acquiring the respective target re-emerges, 
which is the bidder’s worst-case scenario. Consequently, target peers should show nega-
tive abnormal returns, as their chance of becoming a future takeover target fades. At the 
same time, we anticipate bidder peers to exhibit positive abnormal returns, since due to 
the failed pre-emptive merger, their chance of acquiring the originally preferred target in-
creases. 
Economies of Scale and Scope Hypothesis 
The third comparative theory  we  investigate is the economies of scale and scope hy-
pothesis. This hypothesis explains M&A transactions motivated by the intention to realize 
merger synergies that will boost future cash flows and enhance firm value. These include 
operating and financial synergies either due to increased firm size (scale) or as a result of 
firm-specific  combination  advantages  (scope). So  this  hypothesis  summarizes  revenue 
increases, resulting from cross- and/or up-selling, cost reductions due to efficiency gains, 
and  benefits  of  new  opportunities  in  financial  engineering,  tax  savings,  or  cash  slack.   - 15 -
However, our paper focuses on cost synergies, since, according to the relevant literature, 
this is the predominant form of synergies in bank M&A (see, e.g., Cornett and Tehranian 
(1992)). We include this theory to check whether or not investors might actually believe in 
the existence of synergies as the predominant driving force behind an M&A deal. 
Under this hypothesis, in terms of share price reactions, we expect that both targets and 
bidders will be characterized by positive abnormal returns at M&A announcement (event 
1). Target shareholders are offered a takeover premium, while bidder shareholders expect 
merger synergies to boost future cash flows. In contrast, we anticipate target and bidder 
peers will exhibit negative CARs, since due to the synergies of the merging banks, their 
competitive position is deteriorating. So, while any M&A transaction resulting in synergies 
is positive for the participating banks, it has a negative impact on the future operating and 
thus, financial performance of their competitors. If the deal is closed (event 2a), we expect 
exactly  the  same  share  price  reactions  of  all  parties  as  on  announcement.  However, 
should the merger fail (event 2b), we predict a withdrawal to result in negative abnormal 
returns for targets and bidders. In this case, target shareholders lose the takeover pre-
mium,  and  bidders  forgo  value-enhancing  synergies.  Consequently,  target  and  bidder 
peers should show positive abnormal returns upon deal withdrawal. Since the threat of a 
deteriorating competitive position does not materialize, their market shares and their earn-
ings prospects are secured. 
In this respect we expect deals matching our synergy hypothesis to be characterized by 
outperforming  bidders  acquiring  underperforming  targets.  That  is,  because  we  expect 
synergies, especially scale economies, to be largest if there is a substantial difference in 
operating, financial, and managerial performance between the transaction parties. Lang et 
al. ((1989) and (1991)) provide supportive empirical evidence for this phenomenon based 
on analyses of the Tobin’s q of targets and bidders in M&A transactions. However, if ac-
quirers assess these synergies to be uncertain, such takeovers should not be pure cash 
deals.   - 16 - 
Financial Distress Hypothesis 
Since financial distress is a relevant M&A motive within the banking industry, we addition-
ally control for takeovers driven by a target’s weak financial position. The introduction of 
financial distress as a merger motive can also be seen as a further robustness check of 
our results, as it is not deeply based on a theory, but rather is triggered by operating cir-
cumstances that can be observed in any industry. So, if financing issues in practice are a 
relevant deal driver for bank M&A, this outcome should also be reflected in our results. To 
identify financial distress deals, we apply the following filter: Targets must exhibit negative 
abnormal returns upon the events of takeover announcement and deal closing or with-
drawal. The logic behind this assumption is that rational target shareholders should only 
accept a takeover bid lower than the actual equity market value if it is an “all or nothing” 
decision in the terms of either accepting the offer price or going bankrupt. It is only be-
cause  rational  bidders  anticipate  the  target  shareholders’  tendering  strategy  that  they 
launch tender offers well below the current market value of the financially troubled target 
banks.  However,  as  this  is  a  rather  theoretical  criterion,  we  implement  a  second filter 
based on accounting numbers. Thus, target banks of financial distress deals must show a 
low equity ratio compared to all other targets, based on the last available balance sheet 
information prior to the deal announcement. We identify a takeover to be motivated by 
financial distress only if both criteria are satisfied. 
For bidders as well as for target and bidder peers, we are unable to derive clear-cut CAR 
expectations. On the one hand, bidders could exhibit positive abnormal returns, as inves-
tors might believe in a bargain buy and hope restructuring of the financially troubled target 
will work out well. On the other hand, bidder CARs could be negative, as capital markets 
may doubt the bidder’s financial strength and ability to restructure the target. Given these 
opposing potential outcomes within our financial distress hypothesis, we do not anticipate 
abnormal return signs for bidders, target peers, and bidder peers. 
In terms of firm- and deal-specific variables, we expect the financial distress pattern to 
coincide with target banks’ weak operating and financial performance. Moreover, to re-  - 17 -
duce takeover risks for bidders, such deals should primarily involve relatively small targets 
that are acquired in domestic intra-industry deals mainly financed with equity. 
Table 1 summarizes the anticipated signs of cumulative abnormal returns for targets, bid-
ders, and their five respective closest peers upon takeover announcement and deal clos-
ing or withdrawal according to all of our M&A hypotheses illustrated above: In order to 
match one of our theory-related CAR patterns, the respective deal must match at least 
seven out of the possible eight expected abnormal return signs as illustrated in Table 1. 
We relax our expectations to account for the possibility of overlapping corporate news 
events other than the M&A announcement, which might imply divergent economic effects 
and result in different CAR signs. Moreover, this relaxation also helps us to overcome 
potential arbitrary share price reactions, e.g., due to narrow equity markets. However, to 
be more precise, we also perform our empirical analysis for “total matches“ in terms of 
eight out of eight expected CAR signs only. We find that both models qualitatively yield 
the same results.   - 18 - 
Table 1: Expected CAR Signs upon M&A Announcements 
This table displays the expected cumulative abnormal return (CAR) signs given the relevant type of event, 
transaction party, and M&A hypothesis. The first row shows the anticipated stock market reactions for the 
merger wave hypothesis: Upon M&A announcement we expect positive CARs for targets and their peers, 
whereas bidders and their peers should show negative share price reactions. Following this logic, every M&A 
hypothesis exhibits a unique CAR pattern that is represented by an eight-digit string consisting of the CAR 
signs of all relevant transaction parties and deal events. Due to the twofold outcome of every transaction (clos-
ing vs. withdrawal), we need to split each stock return pattern into two CAR sign codes. Thus, e.g. the merger 
wave hypothesis is characterized by the eight digit CAR code “+ - + + + - + +“ for closed and “+ - + + - + - -” for 









Market Power + +  + +
Pre-emptive Merger + -  + - 
Merger Wave  + -  + +
Synergy  + + -  - 
Financial Distress -  n.a. n.a. n.a.
Event 2a: 
Closing 
Market Power + +  + +
Pre-emptive Merger + -  + - 
Merger Wave  + -  + +
Synergy  + + -  - 
Financial Distress -  n.a. n.a. n.a.
Event 2b: 
Cancellation 
Market Power -  -  -  - 
Pre-emptive Merger -  -  -  +
Merger Wave  -  +  -  - 
Synergy  -  -  + +
Financial Distress -  n.a. n.a. n.a.  - 19 -
3.  Data Set 
Based on Thomson One Banker and DataStream data, our total sample contains 600 in-
tra-industry M&A transactions of public banks in North America and Europe in the period 
from 1990 to 2008. We include all transactions where both acquirer and target have a 
primary SIC code ranging from 6000 to 6289 or equaling 6712. Thus insurance, real es-
tate, and holding companies, as well as oil royalty traders and patent owners, are explicitly 
excluded because they might distort the comparability of our results. This assures a ho-
mogeneous transaction sample suitable for our analyses, since inter-industry M&A are 
characterized by different transaction motives and, hence, economic effects that will vary 
from intra-industry deals. 
The countries in our data set include Canada and the USA for North America and Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechten-
stein, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom for Europe. Moreover, we exclude all intercontinental M&A transactions 
where one transaction party is incorporated in North America and the other in Europe. 
This geographical segmentation is useful for two reasons: First, it ensures the quality of 
our peer selection, which would be distorted if we chose North American peers for Euro-
pean banks and vice versa. Second, we are able to use European deals as a control 
sample for robustness checks on the results of North American transactions. 
In addition, we exclude all share buy-backs from our data set, as they are pure intra-firm 
transactions  and  do  not  exhibit  any  M&A  characteristics.  Furthermore,  we  exclude  all 
deals without change of control. Therefore, we set a critical threshold of 30 percent for the 
bidder’s  minimum  equity  stake  in  the  target  that  needs  to  be  exceeded  through  the 
merger. Hence, we only include deals where the bidder owns less than 30 percent of the 
target’s equity before takeover and sought more than 30 percent in the transaction. Fi-
nally, we also exclude relatively small takeovers from our sample, since these deals can-
not be expected to have a significant impact on either the acquirer or its peers. Unlike 
other studies, however, we do not apply an absolute target size criterion but a relative one   - 20 - 
instead. Thus, we only  include deals where the target, as measured by equity market 
value, is at least 0.50 percent of the bidder’s size. 
Our final data set consists of a total of 600 bank M&A, of which 506 transactions, or 84.4 
percent, were closed and 94 deals, or 15.6 percent, were withdrawn. Of these 600 trans-
actions, 450 deals or 75.0 percent were conducted in North America whereas 150 take-
overs representing 25.0 percent of our observations were purely European transactions. A 
regulatory agency was involved in 74.7 percent of all deals. 
We approximate the size of targets and bidders by market capitalization, total assets, and 
deposits, and measure their profitability by EBITDA and Return on Equity (RoE). Average 
market values yield close to 8.4 billion US-Dollars for bidders and around 3.3 billion US-
Dollars for targets, with mean total assets of approximately 89 billion US-Dollars for ac-
quirers and close to 32 billion US-Dollars for targets. The results for average deposits are 
37 billion US-Dollars for bidders and around 14 billion US-Dollars for targets, respectively. 
The average EBITDA amounts to approximately 1.2 billion US-Dollars for acquirers and 
0.2 billion US-Dollars for targets, while RoE, on average, equals 13.0 percent for bidders 
and 3.4 percent for targets. More detailed descriptive statistics, including a comparison of 
North American vs. European deals, are displayed in Table 2. Although there is a sub-
stantial difference in size and variance between US and European M&A deals that can be 
explained by the deregulation and subsequent consolidation of the US banking market in 
the mid to late 1990s, the overall descriptives remain stable for both subsamples. 
As shown in Table 3, analyzing the descriptive statistics of CARs upon M&A events based 
on the index model using a [-3;+3] days event window, which will be explained in detail in 
section 4 below, we derive the following results: Upon takeover announcement, targets 
show significantly positive CARs averaging +15.72 percent, while bidders exhibit signifi-
cantly negative abnormal returns with a mean of -0.89 percent. If the deal is closed, we 
find slightly positive but statistically insignificant CARs for targets as well as for bidders. 
On the other hand, a withdrawal results in significantly negative average CARs of -2.71 
percent for targets, whereas bidders have slightly positive but insignificant CARs. Looking   - 21 -
at the transaction parties’ peers, both target and bidder peers are characterized by slightly 
positive but statistically insignificant average abnormal returns upon takeover announce-
ment. However, the [-10;+10] days event window results in significant abnormal M&A an-
nouncement returns with positive CARs of 0.42 percent for target peers and 0.47 percent 
for bidder peers, on average. At deal closing, target and bidder peers consistently exhibit 
positive but, again, statistically insignificant mean CARs. Finally, if the deal is withdrawn, 
target and bidder peers show positive and insignificant abnormal returns. These results 
are supported by the significance tests of the corresponding median CARs, since the Wil-
coxon signed rank test yields qualitatively the same results as the t-test. Moreover, the [-
1;+1] (not reported) and [-10;+10] event windows as well as the constant mean return and 
CAPM model (both not reported) also confirm the signs and significance levels of mean 
and median abnormal returns. So, all CAR signs and corresponding significance levels 
are in line with previous empirical M&A research. Hence, our results support the common 
findings that, upon takeover announcement, targets exhibit statistically and economically 
highly significant positive CARs, whereas bidders are mostly characterized by significantly 
negative abnormal returns.   - 22 - 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows selected descriptive statistics of our total sample as well as of our North American and Euro-
pean sub-samples. We list market value, total assets, EBITDA, deposits, and return on equity for acquirer and 
targets, as well as price-to-book ratio for targets and deal value for transactions. The bottom of table 1 shows 
some proportions of how many takeovers fall inside certain categories. All applicable values are reported in 
million US-Dollars unless denoted in percent. The number of observations (N) is stated in absolute units. 
 
Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target
Market Value mean 8'390.5 3'328.4 6'049.2 1'398.1 15'414.5 9'119.4
median 1'212.2 136.2 649.7 93.5 5'357.9 1'507.9
s.d. 18'186.6 11'200.2 15'782.6 5'853.5 22'645.8 18'869.1
N 600 600 450 450 150 150
Total Assets mean 88'580.0 31'803.6 37'079.4 9'201.5 274'241.8 110'355.2
median 5'830.6 921.2 3'288.5 691.2 69'451.1 19'796.9
s.d. 280'910.4 143'888.7 109'083.8 35'933.2 527'477.3 284'126.9
N 548 546 429 424 119 122
EBITDA mean 1'206.2 205.7 720.9 116.7 2'937.5 549.0
median 118.7 13.5 62.3 10.5 769.2 108.1
s.d. 4'434.1 562.3 2'220.5 389.1 8'296.9 900.2
N 539 486 421 386 118 100
Deposits mean 37'390.4 13'995.5 19'647.2 5'517.6 103'317.1 46'909.9
median 3'897.4 659.1 2'355.2 486.3 34'735.0 14'770.4
s.d. 92'386.2 50'092.9 52'784.3 19'724.9 156'693.1 97'212.3
N 514 498 405 396 109 102
Return on Equity mean 13.0% 3.4% 12.6% 2.5% 14.3% 6.3%
median 13.3% 0.1% 13.3% 0.1% 13.7% 5.4%
s.d. 6.9% 10.6% 6.1% 8.5% 9.0% 14.9%
N 589 566 448 430 141 136
Price/Book Ratio mean 1.725 1.673 2.096
median 1.603 1.576 1.897
s.d. 0.942 0.825 1.499
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Table 3: Test for Equality of Mean and Median 
The following table shows the results of two types of hypothesis tests for the distributions of abnormal returns 
upon takeover announcement and deal closing or withdrawal. All numbers are based on the index model with 
peer selection based on market capitalization. The upper half shows a standard t-test with the Null hypothesis 
of the mean being equal to zero, H0: mean=0. For robustness reasons we report the statistics of the two sym-
metric event windows of [-3;+3] and [-10;+10] days around the respective events. The lower half reports the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test statistics with the Null being the median equal to zero, H0: median=0.  
 
t-test, H0:mean=0
Window: [-3;+3] Date n mean mean
Announcement 600 -0.885 -3.45 *** 15.720 -19.81 ***
Closing 506 0.403 1.80 * 0.346 -1.34
Withdrawal 94 0.235 0.36 -2.707 2.55 **
Announcement 600 0.209 1.63 0.135 -0.85
Closing 506 0.194 1.36 0.060 -0.34
Withdrawal 94 -0.480 -1.32 -0.345 0.72
Window: [-10;+10]
Announcement 592 -1.017 -3.04 *** 17.044 19.77 ***
Closing 502 0.381 1.17 0.346 0.85
Withdrawal 90 -0.565 -0.47 -3.418 -2.32 **
Announcement 592 0.468 2.15 ** 0.422 1.80 *
Closing 502 0.225 0.95 0.411 1.46
Withdrawal 90 -0.258 -0.40 -0.157 -0.25
Wilcoxon signed rank test, H0: median=0
Window: [-3;+3] Date n median median
Announcement 600 -1.013 -4.95 *** 11.281 17.31 ***
Closing 506 0.202 1.48 -0.047 0.42
Withdrawal 94 0.170 0.59 -1.395 -2.32 **
Announcement 600 0.268 2.09 ** 0.047 1.47
Closing 506 -0.213 -0.07 0.195 0.18
Withdrawal 94 -0.545 -0.81 -0.718 -0.55
Window: [-10;+10]
Announcement 592 -1.485 -3.75 *** 13.724 16.75 ***
Closing 502 0.226 1.11 -0.190 0.39
Withdrawal 90 0.553 -0.41 -3.348 -2.39 **
Announcement 592 0.535 2.52 ** 0.357 2.08 **
Closing 502 0.111 0.81 0.263 1.31
Withdrawal 90 0.448 0.20 -0.015 -0.38
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4.  Methodology and Results 
We apply standard event study methodology to investigate the abnormal returns of tar-
gets, bidders, and their five respective closest peers upon takeover announcement and 
deal closing or withdrawal (for illustrations see Figure 1). To validate our results, we con-
duct  three  different  event  studies  applying  the index  model,  the  constant  mean return 
model, and the CAPM model.
1 The estimation period for the constant mean return and the 
CAPM model is fixed to 250 trading days in the time period from -300 to -51 days prior to 
takeover announcement. For the index model, we use the two DataStream indices “DS 
Banks North America” and “DS Banks Europe” as relevant benchmarks for North Ameri-
can and European deals, respectively. Moreover, we analyze three different events: For 
all deals we identify the takeover announcement date as event 1. For closed deals the 
date effective is defined as event 2a, and for cancelled deals the withdrawal date is event 
2b. To provide further robustness checks, we investigate the three symmetric event win-
dows covering [-1;+1], [-3;+3], and [-10;+10] days around the respective event. Finally we 
calculate the CARs for all relevant event windows. To test for their significance, we apply 
standard mean and median tests using the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test, re-
spectively. 
As we conduct our event study not only for the actual transaction parties but also for their 
five respective closest peers, we introduce a set of four key variables to ensure a sound 
peer selection. This procedure is of high relevance, since we claim that the selected five 
target peers and five bidder peers are the ten banks most comparable to the actual trans-
action parties. Thus, we determine the respective transaction party’s closest peers by the 
following four variables in order to maximize this likelihood: SIC code, equity market capi-
talization, sales region, and firm profitability. First, the bidder’s or target’s four digit primary 
SIC code must exactly match the primary SIC of its respective peers. This criterion is im-
plemented to account for operating differences between banks and, thus, to ensure that 
both  the  original  entity  and  peer  are  operating  within  the  same  industry.  Second,  the 
                                                 
1    ( ) ( ) f m i f f r r r r E − + = β  with a risk-free rate of 4.50 percent and a market risk premium of 5.50 per-
cent.   - 25 -
peer’s  market  capitalization  as  compared  to  the  transactions  party’s  must  be  within  a 
range of plus or minus 25 percent for acquirer peers and within a range of plus or minus 
50 percent for target peers. We chose these values to, first, assure that original entity and 
peers are about the same size and, second, reflect the existing size differences between 
bidders and targets. Third, we identify the sales region as the region where bidder and 
target headquarters are located. All peers are expected to be located in the same geo-
graphic region, which is either North America or Western Europe. Thus, we use the region 
in which the respective firm is incorporated as a proxy for the geographic focus of its busi-
ness activities. Hence, this selection variable helps us to ensure that the actual transac-
tion parties and their peers at least have basically the same sales region.
2 Fourth, the 
profitability proxy is based on empirical evidence: Previous studies have shown that tar-
gets tend to be the least profitable companies within their peer groups, whereas bidders 
are typically the most profitable among their peers (see Hannan and Pilloff (2006), Her-
nando et al. (2007), Altunbas and Marqués (2008), Pasiouras et al. (2007), and Lanine 
and Vennet (2007)). Hence, we select target peers by choosing the five least profitable 
banks and bidder peers by selecting the five most profitable banks matching all above 
criteria. Finally, we filter a list of all public banks in the USA, Canada, and Western Europe 
using these four variables in order to derive the five closest target and bidder peers. 
Table 4 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the observed CAR patterns of targets, bid-
ders, and their five respective closest peers upon the events of takeover announcement 
and deal closing or withdrawal. Based on our sample of 600 international bank M&A trans-
actions in North America and Europe between 1990 and 2008 using the index model with 
a [-3;+3] event window, our results reveal that a total of 65 takeovers, or 10.8 percent, 
follow the CAR pattern of the market power hypothesis. Furthermore, 29 mergers (4.8 
percent) show the pattern of the pre-emptive merger hypothesis, while 25 transactions 
(4.2 percent) exhibit the abnormal return pattern of the economies of scale and scope 
                                                 
2 We control for whether or not a takeover is conducted by the ultimate parent or a subsidiary. This is crucial 
for our differentiation between North American and European deals as well as for our peer selection, since a 
regional peer selection based on subsidiaries would ignore that transactions are actually carried out by parent 
companies.   - 26 - 
hypothesis, and 19 deals (3.2 percent) meet the merger wave pattern. Finally, on average, 
9.1 percent of all deals match our financial distress filter, highlighting that financing issues 
of the target indeed are a relevant deal driver for bank M&A. In sum 28.5 percent of our 
sample deals (171 out of 600 M&A transactions) follow one of the presumed abnormal 
return patterns. To match one of our theory-related CAR patterns, the respective deal 
must match at least seven out of the possible eight expected abnormal return signs as 
illustrated in Table 1. We observe a “total match“ in terms of eight out of eight expected 
CAR signs 22 times for the market power hypothesis (3.7 percent), seven times for the 
economies of scale and scope hypothesis (1.2 percent), and five and four times for the 
merger wave (0.8 percent) and the pre-emptive merger hypothesis (0.7 percent), respec-
tively. 
Table 4 also displays a variety of robustness tests to investigate the consistence of our 
findings. As one check, we determine all CAR patterns for the three symmetric event win-
dows of [-1;+1], [-3;+3], and [-10;+10] days around the events of takeover announcement 
and deal closing or withdrawal separately. Furthermore, we apply three different event 
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Table 4: Test for Equality of Mean and Median 
This table displays the relative frequency distribution of relevant CAR patterns associated with our four M&A 
hypotheses of merger wave, pre-emptive merger, market power, as well as economies of scale and scope. To 
validate our results we compare these four hypotheses with the empirical fact that a substantial proportion of 
bank takeovers is driven by financing issues on the part of the target and thus introduce and analyze financial 
distress as a fifth relevant M&A motive. As a robustness check all relevant CAR patterns have been identified 
for the three symmetric event windows of [-1;+1], [-3;+3], and [-10;+10] days around the events of M&A an-
nouncement and deal closing or withdrawal. For further robustness testing we apply three different event study 
estimation models, namely the index, constant mean return, and CAPM model. Finally, the selection process 
for the five closest target and bidder peers is diversified in two ways.  
Within the sub-sample "closest MV" the ten closest peers are selected as the five target peers and five bidder 
peers which are closest to the actual transaction parties as compared by equity market value one month be-
fore deal announcement. On the other hand, in the sub-sample "closest MV and RoE" these peers are identi-
fied as those banks with the smallest differences based on a combined average of equity market value and 
return on equity last time reported before M&A announcement. The table displays the relative frequency distri-
butions of the theory-related CAR patterns for divergent analyses which show a high degree of persistence. 
Basically, all relative frequency distributions are robust to varying event windows, event study estimation mod-
els, as well as peer selection methods. All given values are reported in percent, except for N which shows the 
absolute number of observations of the respective analysis.   
closest MV closest MV and RoE closest MV closest MV and RoE
Event Window Market Power 10.1% 7.5% 10.5% 13.7%
[-1;+1] Pre-emptive Merger 5.1% 5.7% 5.5% 3.3%
Merger Wave 1.8% 3.1% 4.3% 3.8%
Synergy 5.0% 5.3% 3.6% 3.3%
Financial Distress 4.8% 11.8% 4.8% 11.4%
SUM 26.9% 33.3% 28.8% 35.5%
N 603 228 560 211
Event Window Market Power 10.8% 10.1% 11.1% 12.3%
[-3;+3] Pre-emptive Merger 4.8% 5.7% 4.5% 3.3%
Merger Wave 3.2% 3.9% 2.3% 3.8%
Synergy 4.2% 3.1% 3.6% 3.3%
Financial Distress 5.5% 11.8% 5.0% 10.4%
SUM 28.5% 34.6% 26.6% 33.2%
N 600 228 557 211
Event Window Market Power 11.0% 10.7% 12.9% 13.9%
[-10;+10] Pre-emptive Merger 3.5% 4.9% 2.4% 1.4%
Merger Wave 3.0% 3.1% 2.2% 2.9%
Synergy 2.5% 3.6% 3.1% 3.8%
Financial Distress 6.4% 14.2% 6.5% 13.9%
SUM 26.5% 36.4% 27.1% 36.1%
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Finally, the peer selection process is diversified in two ways. Within the sub-sample "clos-
est MV," we select the ten closest peers as the five target peers and five bidder peers that 
are  closest  to  the  actual  transaction  parties  as compared  by  equity  market  value  one 
month before deal announcement. On the other hand, in the sub-sample "closest MV and 
RoE" we identify the peers as those banks with the smallest differences based on a com-
bined average index of equity market value and return on equity the last time reported 
before M&A announcement. As shown in Table 4, the relative frequency distributions of 
the theory-related CAR patterns are characterized by a high degree of stability for all ro-
bustness  checks.  Basically,  all  relative  frequency  distributions  are  robust  to  divergent 
event windows, event study estimation models, and peer selection methods. 
Figure 2 shows the absolute frequencies of all empirically observed CAR patterns. Each 
dot represents one combined CAR pattern of targets, bidders, and their five respective 
closest peers upon takeover announcement and deal closing or withdrawal. To param-
eterize the divergent CAR patterns, we assign a unique numerical code to each of them. 
This code is generated with a binary eight-digit number, where each digit takes the value 
of one if the respective stock moves up and zero if it moves down. The single digits are 
defined as follows: 1 = target, 2 = target peers, 3 = bidder, 4 = bidder peers (all at take-
over announcement), 5 = target, 6 = target peers, 7 = bidder, and 8 = bidder peers (all at 
deal closing or withdrawal). We do this for closed as well as for withdrawn deals and fi-
nally sort the two subsamples together in numeric order. Therefore, the leftmost value in 
Figure 2 shows transactions that only result in negative abnormal returns for all parties, 
whereas the rightmost value displays takeovers with only positive share price reactions. 
We highlight the CAR patterns for market power and synergy deals with light and dark 
gray bubbles, respectively. Thus, e.g., the uppermost dot (x-axis = 448) with a frequency 
of 20 deals represents the market power pattern for closed deals, whereas the corre-
sponding pattern for withdrawn deals matches the dot on the right bottom (x-axis = 462) of 
Figure 2.   - 29 -
Our research approach leads us to an empirical distribution of mutually exclusive CAR 
patterns. However, theoretically there exist 512 possible different CAR patterns: In two 
divergent events (takeover announcement, and deal closing or withdrawal) there are four 
different stock prices (target, target peers, acquirer, and acquirer peers) that can either 
move up or down. This results in 2
8 = 256 different CAR patterns. As the end of a transac-
tion is twofold and determined by either the deal’s closing or withdrawal, we have to multi-
ply these 265 patterns by 2, deriving 512 theoretically possible CAR patterns. If we hypo-
thetically assume that these 512 patterns are equally distributed, we would expect only a 
0.195 percent (= 
1/512) probability of occurrence for each pattern.   - 30 - 
Figure 2: Absolute Frequencies of empirical CAR Patterns 
Figure 2 shows the absolute frequencies of all empirically observed CAR patterns. Each dot represents one 
combined CAR pattern of targets, bidders, and their five respective closest peers upon takeover announce-
ment and deal closing or withdrawal. To parameterize the divergent CAR patterns, we assign a unique nu-
merical code to each of them. This code is generated by a binary eight-digit number, where each digit takes 
the value of one if the respective stock moves up and zero if it moves down. The single digits are defined as 
follows: 1 = target, 2 = target peers, 3 = bidder, 4 = bidder peers (all at takeover announcement), 5 = target, 6 
= target peers, 7 = bidder, and 8 = bidder peers (all at deal closing or withdrawal). We do this for closed as 
well as for withdrawn deals and finally sort the two subsamples together in numeric order. Therefore, the left-
most value in Figure 2 shows transactions that only result in negative abnormal returns for all parties, whereas 
the rightmost value displays takeovers with only positive share price reactions. We highlight the CAR patterns 
for market power and synergy deals with light and dark gray bubbles, respectively. Thus, the uppermost dot 
(x-axis = 448) with a frequency of 20 deals represents the market power pattern for closed deals, whereas the 
corresponding pattern for withdrawn deals matches the dot on the right bottom (x-axis = 462). 
From a theoretical perspective, there are altogether 512 different CAR patterns that could possibly occur. 
These 512 possibilities are derived as follows: In two divergent events (takeover announcement and deal 
closing or withdrawal) there are four different stock prices (target, target peers, acquirer, and acquirer peers) 
that can either move up or down. This results in 28 = 256 different CAR patterns. As the end of a transaction 
is twofold and either determined by the deal’s closing or withdrawal we have to multiply these 265 patterns by 
2 and finally derive 2 x 28 = 512 theoretically possible CAR patterns. If we hypothetically assume that these 
512 patterns would be equally distributed we end up with an expected probability of occurrence of only 0.195 
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So, how can it be interpreted that our suggested patterns are able to explain 28.5 percent 
of  all  empirically  measured  patterns?  Taking  into  consideration  that  the  expected  fre-
quency, given an equal distribution of patterns, is at 0.195 percent, we believe that the 
28.5 percent are a clear signal that the patterns are not random. We further argue that 
capital markets to a large degree obviously share perceptions of the outcome of bank 
M&A deals and that we are able to capture the five most prominent of these perceptions. 
We find the 28.5 percent especially striking as there is usually a multitude of reasons 
drives shareholder actions. Being able to explain almost a third of shareholder actions 
seems therefore significant. Moreover, capital market reactions suggest the predominance 
of the market power hypothesis, since its related CAR pattern occurs with a considerably 
higher frequency than all others. These results become even more distinct if we consider 
that all our M&A hypotheses capture all CAR patterns with the highest absolute frequen-
cies, except for one which occurs in 14 out of 600 observations. Thus, we can state that 
investors seem to have specific perceptions of bank M&A transactions and trade accord-
ingly. In terms of abnormal returns the market power hypothesis seems to be of most 
relevance in international bank M&A.  
Since the distribution of empirically observed CAR patterns still could be random and, 
thus, unassociated with any of the investigated M&A hypotheses, we need to analyze 
whether the occurrence of a theory-related CAR pattern actually coincides with fundamen-
tals explaining the respective hypotheses. Thus, a suitable model for testing our hypothe-
ses should be able to indicate a significant impact of relevant firm- and deal-specific char-
acteristics associated with the respective M&A hypotheses while at the same time control-
ling for alternative CAR patterns and exogenous effects. So, e.g., concerning the market 
power hypothesis, the occurrence of the related CAR pattern should coincide with big firm 
size, intra-industry M&A, and an increase in market concentration, suggesting a lessening 
of competition. To test the viability of our theoretical indications, we apply a multinomial 
logistic regression approach to jointly test the conditional occurrence probability of our 
theory-related CAR patterns given firm- and deal-specific variables. Hence, we use the 
following regression model:   - 32 - 
 























In this equation, X is the vector of firm and deal characteristics, while β equals the vector 
of coefficients associated with these characteristics. Pr represents the conditional prob-
ability of the occurrence of hypothesis j given the variables vector. Thus, the multinomial 
logistic regression model allows us to analyze which firm- and deal-specific variables have 
an impact on the occurrence probability of a certain theory-related CAR pattern. 
On the left-hand side of the regression, we define four categories: we separately catego-
rize the CAR patterns related to our market power, synergy, and financial distress hy-
potheses. In addition we categorize all other observed abnormal return patterns to a fourth 
category, which is defined as the base case of our regression model. Instead of sepa-
rately  categorizing  the  pre-emptive  merger  and  merger  wave  hypotheses,  we  include 
those two patterns in the base case category, since the underlying theories do not allow 
us to derive a plausible link to any explanatory variable. Nevertheless, we also test the 
robustness  of  our model  by  differentiating  these  two  additional  categories  without  any 
change in our results reported below. On the right-hand side, we include the following 
variables: the ratio of offer price to target earnings, the ratio of shareholders equity to total 
assets of target and acquirer, the log of relative target size compared to the acquirer as 
measured by the ratio of equity market values of target and acquirer, the log of acquirer 
total assets, the return on equity of target and acquirer, the target net income five-year 
growth rate, the ratio of EBITDA to return on assets of the target, the percentage change 
in market concentration around the respective M&A transaction as measured by a region 
and  sub-industry-specific  Hirschman-Herfindahl  index,  and  several  dummies  for  intra-
industry takeovers, whether a regulatory agency was involved in the deal, pure cash pay-
ment, domestic deals, and finally a dummy for North American transactions. Moreover, to 
control for time effects, we add yearly fixed effects to the regression. However, as our 
sample consists of a heavily skewed distribution in terms of transaction size, we need to 
cope with a small transactions bias when analyzing abnormal returns. To mitigate this bias   - 33 -
and consistently improve the economic clarity of our regression model, we weigh all ob-
servations by the log of the target’s market capitalization. For transparency reasons, we 
run our regressions for both equal and value-weighted samples to add further validity to 
our findings. Table 5 reports our regression results. The leftmost part of Table 5 displays 
the multinomial regressions for our equal-weighted sample. For a total of 258 M&A trans-
actions, the results for the market power hypothesis yield a significantly positive coefficient 
of 2.61, which indicates a significantly higher probability of the market power CAR pattern 
for transactions where the target as compared to the acquirer is relatively larger in terms 
of firm size. This becomes even more distinct if we consider the value-weighted regres-
sions on the right-hand section of Table 5, where the log value-weighted model shows a 
highly significant coefficient of 2.74 for the relative target size ratio and, hence, confirms 
our previous results. Moreover, the significantly positive beta of the same industry dummy 
indicates a substantially higher probability for market power effects if target and acquirer 
operate within the same banking sub-industry (beta = 24.01 for equal-weighted and 25.26 
for value-weighted sample). This result seems intuitively plausible since uncoordinated 
price increases can only materialize if, due to a higher market concentration, individual 
market power increases. Thus, smaller bidders benefit disproportionately from the acquisi-
tion of relatively big targets since their bargaining power increases substantially. This ef-
fect is also confirmed by the significantly negative beta of the log of acquirer’s total assets. 
As explicit ex-post control for higher market concentration, we compute a HHI for each 
two-digit-SIC banking sub-industry and every geographic region based on total assets and 
then derive the index change from the quarter prior to the quarter after deal closing. The 
significant beta of 16.187 for the change in HHI reflects a high probability of the coinci-
dence of the market power pattern and an increasing market concentration. For a more 
quantitative analysis we also compute the marginal effects by transforming the HHI coeffi-
cient into percent and then retrieve the marginal effects of  ( ) 176 . 1
16187 . 0 = e . Accordingly, a 
1 percent increase in market concentration results in a 17.60 percent increase in the oc-
currence probability of the market power hypothesis.   - 34 - 
Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 
This table provides the results of our multinomial logistic regression model. On the left-hand side of the re-
gression, we categorize return patterns related to (1) market power hypothesis, (2) synergy hypothesis, (3) 
financial distress hypothesis and (4) all other CAR patterns as base case regression category. On the right-
hand side we control (in this order) for the ratio of offer price to target earnings, the ratio of shareholders eq-
uity to total assets of target and acquirer, the log of relative target size compared to the acquirer as measured 
by the ratio of equity market values of target and acquirer, the log of acquirer total assets, the return on equity 
of target and acquirer, the target net income five year growth rate, the ratio of EBITDA to return on assets of 
the target, the percentage change in market concentration around the respective M&A transaction as meas-
ured by the HHI, and several dummies for intra-industry takeovers, whether a regulatory agency was involved 
in the deal, pure cash payment, domestic deals, and finally a dummy for North American transactions. More-
over, we also add yearly fixed effects to the regression. The left part of the table shows the equal-weighted 
sample, whereas the right part shows the value-weighted regressions based on the log of target market values 
to mitigate the small transactions bias of our sample. The table reports the variables’ betas as well as the 
corresponding t-values in parenthesize. 
                        M. Power Synergy Fin.Dist. M. Power Synergy Fin.Dist.
Bid/Earnings Ratio -0.003 -0.004 0.089* -0.005 -0.009* 0.111***
(-0.37) (-0.44) (1.78) (-1.40) (-1.88) (4.37)
Tg Equity Ratio 2.255 -40.521 -57.073 3.322 -31.423*** -59.201***
(0.49) (-1.62) (-1.63) (1.46) (-2.96) (-3.29)
Aq Equity Ratio 3.002 -3.585 -73.262 4.345 3.710 -83.411***
(0.33) (-0.19) (-1.49) (0.90) (0.46) (-3.31)
log(Tg Relative Size) 2.611* 7.846*** -6.988 2.738*** 8.446*** -7.609***
(1.81) (2.79) (-1.58) (3.88) (7.67) (-3.47)
log(Aq Total Assets) -0.410* -0.089 -0.755 -0.627*** -0.083 -0.863***
(-1.88) (-0.35) (-1.49) (-5.68) (-0.82) (-3.33)
Tg RoE -0.102*** -0.060 0.189 -0.102*** -0.074*** 0.194***
(-2.63) (-1.39) (1.34) (-5.54) (-4.00) (2.81)
Aq RoE 0.074 0.239** -0.128 0.088*** 0.265*** -0.177**
(1.44) (2.42) (-0.88) (3.66) (6.36) (-2.37)
Tg Net Income GR -0.018 -0.039 0.016 -0.021** -0.047*** 0.020
(-1.03) (-1.59) (0.59) (-2.53) (-4.30) (1.47)
EBITDA RoA 39.425 -242.835** 174.839 49.685** -233.859*** 209.579**
(0.91) (-1.99) (1.05) (2.53) (-4.75) (2.37)
Change in HHI 11.647* 0.124 5.674 16.187*** 2.476 5.802
(1.71) (0.01) (0.18) (4.64) (0.65) (0.35)
Same Industry 24.011*** -0.534 19.445 25.257*** -1.065 20.651
(5.34) (-0.31) (12.24) (-1.36) .
Regulatory Agency 1.894* 1.060 1.105 1.896*** 1.662** 0.403
(1.87) (0.65) (0.51) (4.22) (2.41) (0.38)
Cash Only 0.205 -2.047 -51.493 0.305 -1.814** -44.506
(0.23) (-1.26) (-0.00) (0.68) (-2.40) (-0.00)
Domestic Deal 0.624 -1.209 18.872** 0.347 0.312 18.538***
(0.30) (-0.56) (2.11) (0.37) (0.32) (4.16)
North America -2.529** 1.415 -0.987 -3.146*** 1.194 0.068
(-2.15) (0.78) (-0.28) (-5.65) (1.62) (0.04)
Yearly Fixed Effects
N 258              258






The asteriks *, **, and *** mark the significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.
unweighted log value-weighted
Yes Yes
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For the synergy pattern, our multinomial logistic regression model suggests a significant 
coincidence with deals characterized by outperforming bidders acquiring underperforming 
targets in not-pure-cash transactions. Economically, this seems plausible, since econo-
mies of scale offer the highest potential if there is a significant difference in operating 
and/or financial performance between target and acquirer. Thus, our regression results for 
deals matching the synergy hypothesis reveal that involved targets are consistently char-
acterized by significantly lower equity ratios (beta = -31.42) and profitability levels in terms 
of return on equity, net income growth, and EBITDA return on assets, with all variables 
exhibiting significantly negative coefficients of -0.07, -0.05, and -233.86, respectively. Bid-
ders, on the other hand, are substantially more profitable (beta = 0.27) and, given the risk 
of realizing anticipated synergies, seem reluctant to finance such takeovers solely with 
cash (beta = -1.81). 
Looking at financial distress as an M&A motive, we derive that these deals mostly involve 
relatively small targets (beta = -7.61) operating within the same banking sub-industry (beta 
= 20.65) as the bidder. In addition, such takeovers are preferably financed with equity 
(beta = -44.51). Since the acquisition of financially troubled banks involves substantially 
higher risks, it seems reasonable that bidders limit their exposure by taking over signifi-
cantly smaller targets in terms of relative firm size as compared to the M&A deals that 
match our market power or synergy patterns. Moreover, the bidder’s exposure is reduced 
further when acquiring a target that operates exactly the same business lines, as the bid-
der assumes no additional strategic risks from post merger integration. Finally, the means 
of payment complement this story line. So, when takeover risk increases, the willingness 
of bidders to pay cash significantly decreases. 
 
5.  Robustness Checks 
Apart  from  our  main  analysis,  we  conduct  several  robustness  checks.  First,  we  test 
whether our results hold for different specifications of the event study, especially different 
event windows and CAR estimation methods. Second, we analyze the economic signifi-  - 36 - 
cance of the observed cumulative abnormal return patterns by investigating the underlying 
raw returns followed by a confidence interval analysis of the combined CAR patterns. As 
we base our M&A hypotheses on expected CAR signs, our empirical frequencies could be 
driven  by  small  and,  thus,  economically  insignificant  abnormal  returns  close  to  zero. 
Therefore, we add the restriction that only those CARs are considered, which significantly 
differ from zero based on confidence intervals derived from their frequency distributions. 
Still, all our results qualitatively hold on the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. 
To provide a better intuition about the actual magnitude and hence economic relevance of 
the CAR patterns related to our M&A hypothesis we calculate the means and medians of 
the single underlying abnormal returns of transaction parties and peers. So, e.g. upon 
M&A announcement the CAR pattern related to our market power hypothesis yields mean 
positive abnormal returns of 19.59 percent for targets, 3.28 percent for bidders, 2.66 per-
cent for target peers, as well as 2.20 percent for bidder peers. Moreover the deal’s closing 
results in corresponding positive CARs of 4.28 percent, 3.90 percent, 3.43 percent, and 
3.31 percent on average for targets, bidders, target peers and bidder peers respectively. 
Whereas a withdrawn takeover leads to negative mean CARs of -7.10 percent, -3.10 per-
cent, -2.54 percent, and -3.27 percent for the respective parties. The medians are close to 
these averages. 
In a second step we use a bootstrapping approach to compare the observed CAR pattern 
frequencies with theoretically expected values. Thus, we derive a bootstrapped sample 
from our empirical observations to validate the observed CAR pattern frequencies of our 
M&A hypotheses. We conduct the bootstrapping by randomly drawing a large quantity of 
samples out of our empirical distribution. We do this several hundred times to end up with 
several hundred samples. After that we combine these individual samples into one big 
sample. Finally, with this sample we are able to approximate the density distribution of the 
“true” underlying distribution. So we compare the actual frequencies with the ones derived 
via bootstrapping to infer additional insights about which hypothesis occurs more or less   - 37 -
frequently than expected. Originating from our sample, we draw a total of 1,000 random 
sub-samples with 100 observations each. 
Based on this simulation, we derive an expected relative frequency for the market power 
pattern of only 2.5 percent. The huge difference between the empirically observed (10.8 
percent) and the theoretically simulated frequency suggests that the predominance of the 
market power hypothesis might not be a random effect. Moreover, we find extremely low 
frequencies for all other theory-related CAR patterns. Both the merger wave hypothesis 
and the pre-emptive merger hypothesis exhibit an occurrence probability of 0.16 percent, 
while the synergy hypothesis shows an expected relative frequency of only 0.14 percent. 
Hence, it is interesting to note that these CAR patterns appear with simulated relative fre-
quencies close to the occurrence probability suggested by an equal distribution of 0.195 
percent for each pattern. Consistently, the significance of the market power hypothesis 
compared  to  all  other  CAR  patterns  also  holds  for  different  numbers  of  bootstrapping 
repetitions and varying sub-sample sizes. The summary statistics of our bootstrapping 
analyses, including a robustness check for the [-10;+10] event window are illustrated in 
Table 6. 
As a further robustness check, we geographically subdivide our sample by region to test 
whether our findings are driven by country effects. Therefore, we split our data set into the 
two  sub-samples  North  America  and  Europe.  The  rationale  behind  this  geographical 
analysis is that the North American and European financial services industries are charac-
terized by different banking systems, varying market consolidation, and divergent regula-
tion. Thus, these differences might impact the results of our event study. However, if we 
compare the two sub-samples, our results in terms of CAR signs and significance levels 
qualitatively hold for both regions. Thus, our findings suggest that in North America and 
Europe, capital market reactions to bank M&A are at least qualitatively similar. 
The market concentration proxied by a Hirschman Herfindahl Index (HHI) based on the 
total assets appears to have a significant positive impact on the occurrence of the market 
power CAR pattern in the regression model. One could argue that our assumptions on the   - 38 - 
market definition are not accurately reflecting the “true” markets, as they are not necessar-
ily as wide as our two regions Western Europe and North America. To address this cri-
tique, we also compute the HHI time series based on the two-digit SIC level for each indi-
vidual  country  separately.  Based  on  these  new  domestic  market  HHIs,  we  derive  the 
same change in HHI from one quarter before to one quarter after the respective deal’s 
closing or withdrawal. Even when using these more specific HHIs, all our results remain 
unchanged. 
As the portion of market power patterns is revealed so predominantly, we look into the 
data to identify the individual M&A transactions behind the figures. One prominent exam-
ple of a closed deal that exhibits our market power pattern is the merger of Schweize-
rischer Bankverein and the Union Bank of Switzerland, announced in 1997 to form the 
UBS AG, formerly one of the world’s biggest banks. An example of a withdrawn deal that 
follows our CAR pattern is the merger announced in 2000 by Abbey National PLC and 
Bank of Scotland PLC, which was officially withdrawn in 2001.   - 39 -
Table 6: Relative CAR Pattern Frequencies based on Bootstrapping 
This table provides the results of our bootstrapping analyses of CAR pattern frequencies. We perform the 
bootstrapping in order to obtain randomly generated CAR patterns that can be compared with the empirically 
observed CAR patterns. As it could be argued that the observed CAR patterns are a result of chance rather 
than systematic occurrence, the bootstrapping delivers randomly generated results of CAR pattern distribu-
tions. As we perform the bootstrapping analysis using computerized random tests, the given results in the 
tables below are examples of two different bootstrapping approaches with different input parameters. In the 
upper table we perform the analysis for the [-3;+3] event window by drawing 1,000 random sub-samples with 
100 observations each. The lower table shows the results for the [-10;+10] event window by drawing 500 
random sub-samples with 80 observations each. The numbers of sub-samples and observations are chosen 
purely by random; we report these specific features to show that our results hold for various numbers of draw-
ings as well as sub-sample sizes. 
  Empirical Observations  Bootstrapping 
  Event Window [-3;+3]  Random Sample 
M&A Hypothesis  Frequencies in %  Frequencies in % 
Market Power  10.83  2.50 
Pre-emptive mergers  4.83  0.16 
Merger Wave  3.17  0.16 
Synergy  4.17  0.14 
Financial Distress  5.50  1.30 
SUM  28.50  4.26 
 
   
  Event Window [-10;+10]  Random Sample 
M&A Hypothesis  Frequencies in %  Frequencies in % 
Market Power  10.98  1.30 
Pre-emptive mergers  3.55  0.48 
Merger Wave  3.04  0.23 
Synergy  2.53  0.31 
Financial Distress  6.42  0.82 
SUM  26.52  3.14 
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Figure 3: Banking Market Concentration and Market Power Hypothesis 
This figure shows the quarterly market concentration for the banking sub-industry defined by all SIC codes between 6000 and 6099 plus 6712 for Western Europe and the US, respec-
tively. In this diagram we show the market concentration using a Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI) based on the banks’ total assets. Additionally, we mark those quarters (black dots) 
that contain M&A transactions following our market power pattern. The time series is normalized to 100 percent in the year 1990. The graph shows a substantial increase in market 
concentration in Europe compared to the US, which first declines during the 1990s and then moderately increases from the year 2000 on. Opposed to the multivariate results from the 
regression analysis, our descriptive statistics suggest varying time lags for increasing market concentration subsequent to unilateral effects. Still, when taking the time spans of one 
quarter surrounding each unilateral effects spot [-1 to +1 quarter] in this picture, 56 percent of them show an upward shift. Even more clearly, when we sum up all percentage gains 
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A critique concerning market concentration can be derived from the underlying time series of 
our HHI. Figure 3 shows the quarterly market concentration for the banking sub-industry de-
fined by all SIC codes between 6000 and 6099 plus 6712 for Western Europe and the USA, 
respectively.  In  this  diagram  we  show  the  market  concentration  using  a  Hirschman-
Herfindahl-Index (HHI) based on the banks’ total assets. Additionally, we mark those quar-
ters (black dots) that contain M&A transactions that follow our market power pattern. The 
time series is normalized to 100 percent in the year 1990. The graph shows a substantial 
increase in market concentration in Europe compared to the USA, which first declines during 
the 1990s and then moderately increases from the year 2000 on. Opposed to the multivariate 
results from the regression analysis, our descriptive statistics suggest varying time lags for 
increasing market concentration subsequent to the unilateral effects. Still, when taking the 
time spans of one quarter surrounding each unilateral effects spot [-1;+1 quarter] in this pic-
ture, 56 percent of them show an upward shift. Even more clearly, when we sum up all per-
centage gains and losses in HHI around unilateral effects, we end up with a net gain of 18.7 
percent in market concentration in Western Europe and 48.2 percent in the USA. 
Another factor we have to take into account is the substantial deregulation of the US banking 
market in the mid to late 1990s. Foremost, in 1994 the adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act repealed the interstate provisions of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956. Only after the reform, bank holding companies were allowed to ac-
quire banks incorporated in different states of the US. The second important deregulation 
was the introduction of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. By repealing the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933, it allowed commercial banks doing retail business to offer, or acquire banks that 
offer, investment banking services such as security underwriting and vice versa. As mirrored 
in the HHI development in the US banking industry, these deregulations facilitated market 
consolidation  significantly  (also  see,  e.g.,  Lown  et  al.  (2000),  Strahan  and  Suti  (2001), 
Kroszner and Strahan (2006)). To control for potential effects of these regulatory changes on 
our results, we separately analyze subsamples of pre and post US deregulation M&A activity 
and indeed find deregulation to be a trigger for deals following our market power pattern.   - 42 - 
6.  Conclusion 
Our paper empirically analyzes capital markets perceptions of banks’ exploitation of market 
power and the resulting economic benefits for the involved parties. Through an event study 
we investigate abnormal returns of targets, bidders, and their five respective closest peers 
upon takeover announcement and deal closing or withdrawal. To account for additional mar-
ket perceptions regarding bank M&A, we compare the market power hypothesis to four other 
frequently  applied  M&A  hypotheses:  merger  waves,  pre-emptive  mergers,  economies  of 
scale and scope and financial distress hypothesis. 
Based on a sample of 600 bank M&A in North America and Europe in the period from 1990 
to 2008 we find that the stock return pattern of the market power hypothesis is by far the 
most frequent in international bank M&A (10.8 percent of all sample deals), especially com-
pared to the CAR patterns of the merger waves (3.2 percent), the pre-emptive merger (4.8 
percent), the economies of scale and scope hypothesis (4.2 percent) and the financial dis-
tress hypothesis (5.5 percent) which seem to play only a minor role. Prior research focused 
on the existence of market power exploitation and unilateral price effects as a consequence 
of M&A transactions and tried to quantify unilateral effects in terms of magnitude of observed 
price increases. However, we apply a different research approach. Our paper does not ques-
tion the actual ex-post existence of unilateral price effects as a consequence of increased 
market power but instead analyzes the capital market’s ex-ante perception of whether or not 
there is potential for a decrease in competition through bank M&A. Nevertheless, our de-
scriptive statistics and the corresponding significance levels are in line with previous litera-
ture. 
All our results are subject to a variety of robustness checks: First, we investigate the three 
symmetric event windows of [-1;+1], [-3;+3], and [-10;+10] days around the events of take-
over announcement and deal closing or withdrawal. In addition, we control for three diver-
gent  event  study  estimation  methods,  namely  index,  constant  mean  return,  and  CAPM 
model. To test the economic significance of the observed CAR patterns, we analyze the un-
derlying raw returns of targets, bidders, and their peers. Furthermore, we run our tests in   - 43 -
subsamples of economically significant CARs only, based on various confidence intervals. 
We also test the statistical significance of our CAR patterns by applying a bootstrap tech-
nique to validate the persistence of the observed frequency distribution of the observed CAR 
patterns to underpin that our results are not random. As a result of these robustness checks 
all our findings qualitatively hold, and we derive that the observed CAR patterns are both 
statistically and economically significant. Finally, to show the plausibility of our results we 
introduce a multinomial logistic regression model and show that our–ex-ante–indication of 
market power effects significantly concurs with large relative target size, intra-industry take-
overs, and a strong increase in market concentration. This suggests not only a substantial 
lessening of competition through bank M&A but also the capital markets’ ability to anticipate 
such anticompetitive takeover effects.  
Even though there clearly exist more than the five M&A motives explicitly investigated in this 
paper we do not inspect certain other motives since it is impossible to derive specific stock 
return patterns. Nevertheless, we document all empirically observed patterns of our sample 
regardless of a corresponding hypothesis, and, our analysis shows the persistence of the 
market power hypothesis, especially when pictured as in Figure 2. We provide a comparison 
of the five most established M&A theories. By including financial distress as a relevant deal 
driver for bank M&A, we introduce a specific filter to identify takeovers motivated by targets’ 
refinancing issues. With an average relative frequency of 5.5 percent, this merger motive, 
indeed,  seems  to  be  of  high  relevance.  Furthermore,  our  multinomial  logistic  regression 
model indicates that the deals that match our financial distress pattern actually involve tar-
gets with weak operating and financial performance. 
To add some more economic intuition to our results, we argue that, due to the practical chal-
lenge of realizing economies of scale within the banking industry, the predominance of the 
market power hypothesis seems intuitively plausible. The challenge of realizing synergies is 
not only anecdotally evident, but also manifested in the lasting scientific discussion about the 
existence of scale economies within the banking industry. Thus, the lessening of competition 
might be a good opportunity for banks to achieve relatively safe merger gains. This phe-  - 44 - 
nomenon is also supported by economic theory and recent empirical research. Both suggest 
that higher market concentration caused by the ongoing consolidation of global banking mar-
kets facilitates anticompetitive effects. This evidence goes hand in hand with statistically and 
economically significant price increases subsequent to bank M&A. Thus, our findings extend 
the strand of empirical M&A literature by deriving that capital markets strongly believe in the 
existence of unilateral effects and, hence, in a substantial decrease of competition following 
M&A transactions within the banking industry. 
We conclude that, first, capital markets believe in a lessening of competition due to M&A and 
that, second, those effects are fostered by the ongoing consolidation of the global banking 
industry. In the light of these findings and given the market context of banks in the area of 
conflict between growth and profitability, unilateral effects might indeed be the driving force 
behind bank M&A. Hence, our results also hold economic and regulatory implications, be-
cause  if  investors  believe  in  the  existence  of  anticompetitive  effects  subsequent  to  bank 
M&A,  then  lessening  of  competition  becomes  a  promising  M&A  motive.  This,  however, 
should lead to questions regarding current regulatory policies or even to a call for a more 
careful takeover supervision in the banking sector. Concerning the regulator’s trade-off be-
tween creating a national banking champion to ensure credit supply and enforce financial 
market stability or protecting consumers by assuring competitive market pricing, our results 
suggest capital markets believe that takeover regulation tends to solve this trade-off in favor 
of strong players. As banks seem to be able to earn extra rents by exploiting consumer sur-
plus,  antitrust  policy  may  possibly  be  ineffective  to  prevent  market  consolidation  through 
bank M&A to result in market power and unilateral price effects. Against the background of 
the current financial crisis, this supervision strategy for bank M&A seems, at the very least, 
disputable. Since this question goes far beyond the scope of our paper, our results offer a 
base for future research investigating the economic relevance of market power and unilateral 
effects in terms of welfare effects in the banking market and, if applicable, developing and 
analyzing suitable regulatory responses.   - 45 -
References 
 
Altunbas, Y., Marqués, D., 2008. Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe: 
The role of strategic similarities. Journal of Economics and Business, 60(08), pp. 204-
222. 
 
Asquith, P., 1983. Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 11(1-4), pp. 51-83. 
 
Beck, T., Kunt-Demirgüc, A., Levine, R., 2006. Bank concentration, competition and crises: 
First results. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30(5), pp. 1581-1603. 
   
Beitel, P., Schiereck, D., and Wahrenburg, M., 2004. Explaining M&A Success in European 
Banks. European Financial Management, 10(1), pp. 109-139. 
 
Berger, A. N., 1995. The Profit-Structure Relationship in Banking--Tests of Market-Power 
and Efficient-Structure Hypotheses. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27(2), pp. 
404-431. 
 
Berger, A. N., Goldberg, L. G., White, L. J., 2001. The Effects of Dynamic Changes in Bank 
Competition on the Supply of Small Business Credit. European Finance Review, 5(1-
2), pp. 115-139. 
 
Berger, A. N., Hannan, T. H., 1989. The Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(2), pp. 291-299. 
 
Berger, A. N., Saunders, A., Scalise, J. M., Udell, G. F., 1998. The effects of bank mergers 
and acquisitions on small business lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(2), pp. 
187-229. 
 
Bester, H., 2007. Theory of industrial economics, Berlin 2007. 
 
Bhattacharya, S., Plank, M., Strobl, G., Zechner, J., 2002. Bank capital regulation with ran-
dom audits. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(7), pp. 1301-1321. 
 
Bikker, J., Haaf, K., 2002. Competition, Concentration and Their Relationship: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Banking Industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(11), pp. 2191-
2214. 
   
Bradley, M., Desai, A., Kim, E., 1983. The rationale behind interfirm tender offers: Informa-
tion or synergy?. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), pp. 183-206. 
   
Brito, D., 2003. Preemptive mergers under spatial competition. International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization, 21(10), pp. 1601-1622. 
 
Casu, B., Girardone C., 2006. Bank competition, concentration and efficiency in the single 
European market. The Manchester School, 74(4), pp. 441-468. 
 
Cetorelli, N., Hirtle, B., Morgan, D., Peristiani S., Santos, J., 2007. Trends in financial market 
concentration  and  their  implications  for  market  stability.  Economic  Policy  Review, 
13(1), pp. 33-51. 
   
Cornett,  M.  M.,  Tehranian,  H.,  1992.  Changes  in  corporate  performance  associated  with 
bank  acquisitions.  Journal  of  Financial  Economics,  31(92),  pp.  211-234. 
   - 46 - 
Croson, R. T. A., Gomes, A., McGinn, K. L., Nöth, M., 2004. Mergers and Acquisitions: An 
Experimental Analysis of Synergies, Externalities and Dynamics. Review of Finance, 
8(4), pp 481-514. 
 
Dassiou, X., Holl, P., 1996. Merger failure and merger profitability: An alternative to the Hviid 
and Prendergast model. Applied Economics Letters, 3(4), pp. 271-273. 
   
Davidson, W. N., Dutia, D., Cheng, L., 1989. A re-examination of the market reaction to failed 
mergers. The Journal of Finance, 44(4), pp. 1077-1088. 
 
De Guevara, J., Maudos, J., Pérez, F., 2005. Market Power in European Banking Sectors. 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 27(2), pp. 109-137. 
 
Degryse, H., Ongena, S., 2007. Competition and Regulation in the Banking Sector: A Review 
of the Empirical Evidence on the Sources of Bank Rents, Working Paper. 
 
Deneckere, R., Davidson, C., 1985. Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition. 
RAND Journal of Economics, 16(4), pp. 473-486. 
   
Dodd, P., 1980. Merger proposals, management discretion and stockholder wealth. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 8(2), pp. 105-137. 
   
Dodd, P., Ruback, R., 1977. Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 5(3), pp. 351-373. 
   
Eckbo, B. E., 1983. Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 11(1-4), pp. 241-273. 
   
Eckbo, B. E., 1985. Mergers and the market concentration doctrine: Evidence from the capi-
tal market. The Journal of Business, 58(3), pp. 325-349.   
 
Hannan, T. H., Berger, A. N., 1991. The Rigidity of Prices: Evidence from the Banking Indus-
try. The American Economic Review, 81(4), pp. 938-945. 
   
Hannan, T. H., Pilloff, S., 2006. Acquisition Targets and Motives in the Banking Industry, Fi-
nance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.. 
 
Hernando, I., Nieto, M. J., Wall, L., 2007. Determinants of national and cross border bank 
acquisitions in the European Union, Working Paper 2007. 
   
Holl, P., Dassiou, X., Kyriazis, D., 1997. Testing for asymmetric information effects in failed 
mergers. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 4(2), pp. 155-172. 
   
Houston, J. F., Ryngaert, M. D., 1994. The overall gains from large bank mergers. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 18(6), pp. 1155-1176. 
   
Hviid, M., Prendergast, C., 1993. Merger Failure and Merger Profitability. The Journal of In-
dustrial Economics, 41(4), pp. 371-386. 
 
Klemperer, P., 1987a. The competitiveness of markets with switching costs. RAND Journal 
of Economics, 18(1), pp. 138-150. 
 
Klemperer, P., 1987b. Markets with consumer switching costs. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 102(2), pp. 375-394. 
     - 47 -
Klemperer, P., 1995. Competition when consumers have switching costs: An overview with 
applications to industrial organization, macroeconomics, and international trade. Re-
view of Economic Studies, 62(4), pp. 515-539. 
 
Kroszner,  R.,  Strahan,  P.,  2006.  Regulation  &  deregulation  of  the  US  banking  industry: 
causes, consequences and implications for the future, NBER Working Paper Series. 
 
Kwoka, J. E., 1989. The private profitability of horizontal mergers with non-Cournot and Mav-
erick behavior. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7(3), pp. 403-411. 
 
Lang, L. H.P., Stulz, R. M., Walkling, R. A., 1989. Managerial performance, Tobin's Q, and 
the gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 24(1), pp. 
137-154. 
 
Lang, L. H.P., Stulz, R. M., Walkling, R. A., 1991. A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The 
case of bidder returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 29(2), pp. 315-335. 
 
Lanine,  G.,  Vennet,  R.  V.,  2007.  Microeconomic  determinants  of  acquisitions  of  Eastern 
European  banks  by  Western  European  banks.  Economics  of  Transition,  15(2),  pp. 
285-308. 
   
Lorenz, J.-T., Schiereck, D., 2007. Completed versus cancelled banking M&A transactions in 
Europe, Working Paper 2007. 
 
Lown, C., Osler, C., Strahan, P., Suti, A., 2000. The changing landscape of the financial ser-
vices industry: what lies ahead?, Federal Reserve Board of New York Working Paper 
Series. 
 
Margsiri, W., Mello, A. S., Ruckes, M. E., 2008. A Dynamic Analysis of Growth via Acquisi-
tion. Review of Finance, 12(4), pp. 635-671. 
   
Mitchell, M. L., Mulherin, J. H., 1996. The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restruc-
turing activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(2), pp. 193-229. 
   
Otchere, I., Ip, E., 2006. Intra-industry effects of completed and cancelled cross border ac-
quisitions in Australia: A test of the acquisition probability hypothesis. Pacific-Basin Fi-
nance Journal, 14(2), pp. 209-230. 
 
Pasiouras, F., Tanna, S., Gaganis, C., 2007. What drives acquisitions in the EU banking in-
dustry? The role of bank regulation and supervision framework, bank specific and mar-
ket specific factors, Coventry University Working Paper Series, 3/2007. 
   
Pilloff, S. J., Santomero, A. M., 1996. The value effects of bank mergers and acquisitions, 
Working Paper 1996. 
   
Song, M. H., Walkling, R. A., 2000. Abnormal returns to rivals of acquisition targets:  test of 
the acquisition probability hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, 55(2), pp. 143-
171. 
   
Stillman, R., 1983. Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 11(1-4), pp. 225-240. 
 
Strahan, P., Suti, A., 2001. The gains from financial modernization, Federal Reserve Board 
of New York Working Paper Series. 
 
Stulz, R. M., 1988. Managerial Control of Voting Rights – Financing Policies and the Market 
for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), pp. 25-54.   - 48 - 
 
Stulz, R. M., Walkling, R. A., Song, M.H., 1990. The Distribution of Target Ownership and the 
Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 45(3), pp. 817-833. 
 
Weinberg, M., 2007. The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers. Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics, 4(2), pp. 433-447. 
 
Werden, G. J., 2006. Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers I: Basic Concepts 
and Models, Issues in Competition Law and Policy, 2006. 
   
Ziss, S., 2001. Horizontal mergers and delegation. International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation, 19(3-4), pp. 471-492. 
  
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 129  49 
 
FRANKFURT SCHOOL / HFB – WORKING PAPER SERIES  
No.  Author/Title  Year 
128.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Outline of a Darwinian Theory of Money  2009 
127.  Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens 
Modellierung des Kreditrisikos im Portfoliofall 
 
2009 
126.  Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens 
Modellierung des Kreditrisikos im Einwertpapierfall 
 
2009 
125.  Heidorn, Thomas / Schmaltz, Christian 
Interne Transferpreise für Liquidität 
 
2009 
124.  Bannier, Christina E. / Hirsch, Christian 
The economic function of credit rating agencies - What does the watchlist tell us?  
 
2009 
123.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
A Neurolinguistic Approach to Performativity in Economics  
 
2009 
122.  Winkler, Adalbert / Vogel, Ursula 




121.  Heidorn, Thomas / Rupprecht, Stephan 
Einführung in das Kapitalstrukturmanagement bei Banken 
 
2009 
120.  Rossbach, Peter 
Die Rolle des Internets als Informationsbeschaffungsmedium in Banken 
 
2009 
119.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Diversity Management und diversi-tätsbasiertes Controlling: Von der „Diversity Scorecard“ zur „Open Balanced 
Scorecard 
2009 
118.  Hölscher, Luise / Clasen, Sven  
Erfolgsfaktoren von Private Equity Fonds 
 
2009 
117.  Bannier, Christina E. 
Is there a hold-up benefit in heterogeneous multiple bank financing? 
 
2009 
116.  Roßbach, Peter / Gießamer, Dirk  
Ein eLearning-System zur Unterstützung der Wissensvermittlung von Web-Entwicklern in Sicherheitsthemen 
 
2009 
115.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Kulturelle Hybridisierung und Wirtschaftstransformation in China  
 
2009 
114.  Schalast, Christoph: 
Staatsfonds – „neue“ Akteure an den Finanzmärkten? 
 
2009 
113.  Schalast, Christoph / Alram, Johannes 
Konstruktion einer Anleihe mit hypothekarischer Besicherung 
 
2009 
112.  Schalast, Christoph / Bolder, Markus / Radünz, Claus / Siepmann, Stephanie / Weber, Thorsten 
Transaktionen und Servicing in der Finanzkrise: Berichte und Referate des Frankfurt School NPL Forums 2008 
 
2009 
111.  Werner, Karl / Moormann, Jürgen 
Efficiency and Profitability of European Banks – How Important Is Operational Efficiency? 
 
2009 
110.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Moralische Gefühle als Grundlage einer wohlstandschaffenden Wettbewerbsordnung:  
Ein neuer Ansatz zur erforschung von Sozialkapital und seine Anwendung auf China 
2009 
109.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Roder, Christoph  
Empirische Analyse der Drawdowns von Dach-Hedgefonds 
 
2009 
108.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Neuroeconomics, Naturalism and Language 
 
2008 
107.  Schalast, Christoph / Benita, Barten 
Private Equity und Familienunternehmen – eine Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung deutscher  
Maschinen- und Anlagenbauunternehmen  
 
2008 
106.  Bannier, Christina E. / Grote, Michael H. 
Equity Gap? – Which Equity Gap? On the Financing Structure of Germany’s Mittelstand 
 
2008 
105.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance  
 
2008 
104.  Schalast, Christoph (Hrgs.) / Schanz, Kay-Michael / Scholl, Wolfgang  
Aktionärsschutz in der AG falsch verstanden? Die Leica-Entscheidung des LG Frankfurt am Main 
 
2008 
103.  Bannier, Christina E./ Müsch, Stefan  




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 129 
 
102.  Cremers, Heinz / Vetter, Michael 
Das IRB-Modell des Kreditrisikos im Vergleich zum Modell einer logarithmisch normalverteilten Verlustfunktion 
 
2008 
101.  Heidorn, Thomas / Pleißner, Mathias 
Determinanten Europäischer CMBS Spreads. Ein empirisches Modell zur Bestimmung der Risikoaufschläge von 




100.  Schalast, Christoph (Hrsg.) / Schanz, Kay-Michael  
Schaeffler KG/Continental AG im Lichte der CSX Corp.-Entscheidung des US District Court for the Southern District 




99.  Hölscher, Luise / Haug, Michael / Schweinberger, Andreas 
Analyse von Steueramnestiedaten 
 
2008 
98.  Heimer, Thomas / Arend, Sebastian 
The Genesis of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Formula 
 
2008 
97.  Heimer, Thomas / Hölscher, Luise / Werner, Matthias Ralf 
Access to Finance and Venture Capital for Industrial SMEs 
 
2008 
96.  Böttger, Marc / Guthoff, Anja / Heidorn, Thomas 
Loss Given Default Modelle zur Schätzung von Recovery Rates 
 
2008 
95.  Almer, Thomas / Heidorn, Thomas / Schmaltz, Christian 
The Dynamics of Short- and Long-Term CDS-spreads of Banks 
 
2008 
94.  Barthel, Erich / Wollersheim, Jutta 





93.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kunze, Wolfgang / Schmaltz, Christian 
Liquiditätsmodellierung von Kreditzusagen (Term Facilities and Revolver) 
 
2008 
92.  Burger, Andreas 
Produktivität und Effizienz in Banken – Terminologie, Methoden und Status quo 
 
2008 
91.  Löchel, Horst / Pecher, Florian 
The Strategic Value of Investments in Chinese Banks by Foreign Financial Insitutions 
 
2008 
90.  Schalast, Christoph / Morgenschweis, Bernd / Sprengetter, Hans Otto / Ockens, Klaas / Stachuletz, Rainer /  
Safran, Robert  






89.  Schalast, Christoph / Stralkowski, Ingo 
10 Jahre deutsche Buyouts 
 
2008 
88.  Bannier, Christina E./ Hirsch, Christian 
The Economics of Rating Watchlists: Evidence from Rating Changes 
 
2007 
87.  Demidova-Menzel, Nadeshda / Heidorn, Thomas 
Gold in the Investment Portfolio 
 
2007 
86.  Hölscher, Luise / Rosenthal, Johannes 
Leistungsmessung der Internen Revision 
 
2007 
85.  Bannier, Christina / Hänsel, Dennis 
Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization 
 
2007 
84.  Bannier, Christina 
“Smoothing“ versus “Timeliness“ - Wann sind stabile Ratings optimal und welche Anforderungen sind an optimale 
Berichtsregeln zu stellen? 
 
2007 
83.  Bannier, Christina E. 
Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing: Does it Reduce Inefficient Credit-Renegotiation Incidences? 
 
2007 
82.  Cremers, Heinz / Löhr, Andreas 
Deskription und Bewertung strukturierter Produkte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung verschiedener Marktszenarien 
 
2007 
81.  Demidova-Menzel, Nadeshda / Heidorn, Thomas 
Commodities in Asset Management 
 
2007 
80.  Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens 
Risikosteuerung mit Kreditderivaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Credit Default Swaps 
 
2007 
79.  Cremers, Heinz / Traughber, Patrick 





78.  Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Roffia, Barbara 
Monetary Analysis: A VAR Perspective 
 
2007 
77.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Muschiol, Andrea 
Portfoliooptimierung mit Hedgefonds unter Berücksichtigung höherer Momente der Verteilung 
 
2007 
76.  Jobe, Clemens J. / Ockens, Klaas / Safran, Robert / Schalast, Christoph 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 129  51 
 
75.  Abrar, Kamyar / Schalast, Christoph 
Fusionskontrolle in dynamischen Netzsektoren am Beispiel des Breitbandkabelsektors 
 
2006 
74.  Schalast, Christoph / Schanz, Kay-Michael 
Wertpapierprospekte: Markteinführungspublizität nach EU-Prospektverordnung und Wertpapierprospektgesetz 2005 
 
2006 
73.  Dickler, Robert A. / Schalast, Christoph 
Distressed Debt in Germany: What´s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
2006 
72.  Belke, Ansgar / Polleit, Thorsten  
How the ECB and the US Fed set interest rates 
 
2006 
71.  Heidorn, Thomas / Hoppe, Christian / Kaiser, Dieter G.  
Heterogenität von Hedgefondsindizes 
 
2006 
70.  Baumann, Stefan / Löchel, Horst  
The Endogeneity Approach of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas - What does it mean for ASEAN + 3? 
 
2006 




68.  Heidorn, Thomas / Hoppe, Christian / Kaiser, Dieter G.  
Möglichkeiten der Strukturierung von Hedgefondsportfolios 
 
2005 
67.  Belke, Ansgar / Polleit, Thorsten 
(How) Do Stock Market Returns React to Monetary Policy ? An ARDL Cointegration Analysis for Germany  
 
2005 
66.  Daynes, Christian / Schalast, Christoph  
Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Bank- und Kapitalmarktsrechts II: Distressed Debt - Investing in Deutschland  
 
2005 
65.  Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Polleit, Thorsten 
Measures of excess liquidity 
 
2005 
64.  Becker, Gernot M. / Harding, Perham / Hölscher, Luise 
Financing the Embedded Value of Life Insurance Portfolios  
 
2005 
63.  Schalast, Christoph 
Modernisierung der Wasserwirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb – Braucht Deutschland 
eine Rechtsgrundlage für die Vergabe von Wasserversorgungskonzessionen? – 
 
2005 
62.  Bayer, Marcus / Cremers, Heinz / Kluß, Norbert 
Wertsicherungsstrategien für das Asset Management  
 
2005 
61.  Löchel, Horst / Polleit, Thorsten 
A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy  
 
2005 
60.  Richard, Jörg / Schalast, Christoph / Schanz, Kay-Michael 
Unternehmen im Prime Standard - „Staying Public“ oder „Going Private“? - Nutzenanalyse der Börsennotiz -  
 
2004 
59.  Heun, Michael / Schlink, Torsten 
Early Warning Systems of Financial Crises - Implementation of a currency crisis model for Uganda  
 
2004 
58.  Heimer, Thomas / Köhler, Thomas 
Auswirkungen des Basel II Akkords auf österreichische KMU 
 
2004 
57.  Heidorn, Thomas / Meyer, Bernd / Pietrowiak, Alexander 
Performanceeffekte nach Directors´Dealings in Deutschland, Italien und den Niederlanden 
 
2004 
56.  Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Roffia, Barbara 
The Relevance of real-time data in estimating reaction functions for the euro area 
 
2004 
55.  Barthel, Erich / Gierig, Rauno / Kühn, Ilmhart-Wolfram 
Unterschiedliche Ansätze zur Messung des Humankapitals 
 
2004 
54.  Anders, Dietmar / Binder, Andreas / Hesdahl, Ralf / Schalast, Christoph / Thöne, Thomas 
Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Bank- und Kapitalmarktrechts I :  




53.  Polleit, Thorsten 
The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited 
 
2004 
52.  Heidorn, Thomas / Siragusano, Tindaro 
Die Anwendbarkeit der Behavioral Finance im Devisenmarkt 
 
2004 
51.  Schütze, Daniel / Schalast, Christoph (Hrsg.)  
Wider die Verschleuderung von Unternehmen durch Pfandversteigerung 
 
2004 
50.  Gerhold, Mirko / Heidorn, Thomas  
Investitionen und Emissionen von Convertible Bonds (Wandelanleihen)  
 
2004 
49.  Chevalier, Pierre / Heidorn, Thomas / Krieger, Christian 
Temperaturderivate zur strategischen Absicherung von Beschaffungs- und Absatzrisiken  
 
2003 
48.  Becker, Gernot M. / Seeger, Norbert 
Internationale Cash Flow-Rechnungen aus Eigner- und Gläubigersicht  
 
2003 
47.  Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M. 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 129 
 
46.  Hess, Dieter 
Determinants of the relative price impact of unanticipated Information in 
U.S. macroeconomic releases 
 
2003 
45.  Cremers, Heinz / Kluß, Norbert / König, Markus  
Incentive Fees. Erfolgsabhängige Vergütungsmodelle deutscher Publikumsfonds 
 
2003 
44.  Heidorn, Thomas / König, Lars 
Investitionen in Collateralized Debt Obligations 
 
2003 
43.  Kahlert, Holger / Seeger, Norbert 
Bilanzierung von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen nach US-GAAP 
 
2003 
42.  Beiträge von Studierenden des Studiengangs BBA 012 unter Begleitung von Prof. Dr. Norbert Seeger 
Rechnungslegung im Umbruch - HGB-Bilanzierung im Wettbewerb mit den internationalen  
Standards nach IAS und US-GAAP 
 
2003 
41.  Overbeck, Ludger / Schmidt, Wolfgang 
Modeling Default Dependence with Threshold Models 
 
2003 
40.  Balthasar, Daniel / Cremers, Heinz / Schmidt, Michael 
Portfoliooptimierung mit Hedge Fonds unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Risikokomponente 
 
2002 
39.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kantwill, Jens 
Eine empirische Analyse der Spreadunterschiede von Festsatzanleihen zu Floatern im Euroraum 




38.  Böttcher, Henner / Seeger, Norbert 
Bilanzierung von Finanzderivaten nach HGB, EstG, IAS und US-GAAP 
 
2003 
37.  Moormann, Jürgen 
Terminologie und Glossar der Bankinformatik 
 
2002 
36.  Heidorn, Thomas 
Bewertung von Kreditprodukten und Credit Default Swaps 
 
2001 
35.  Heidorn, Thomas / Weier, Sven 
Einführung in die fundamentale Aktienanalyse 
 
2001 
34.  Seeger, Norbert 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
 
2001 
33.  Moormann, Jürgen / Stehling, Frank 
Strategic Positioning of E-Commerce Business Models in the Portfolio of Corporate Banking 
 
2001 
32.  Sokolovsky, Zbynek / Strohhecker, Jürgen 
Fit für den Euro, Simulationsbasierte Euro-Maßnahmenplanung für Dresdner-Bank-Geschäftsstellen 
 
2001 
31.  Roßbach, Peter 
Behavioral Finance - Eine Alternative zur vorherrschenden Kapitalmarkttheorie? 
 
2001 
30.  Heidorn, Thomas / Jaster, Oliver / Willeitner, Ulrich 
Event Risk Covenants 
 
2001 
29.  Biswas, Rita / Löchel, Horst 
Recent Trends in U.S. and German Banking: Convergence or Divergence? 
 
2001 
28.  Eberle, Günter Georg / Löchel, Horst 
Die Auswirkungen des Übergangs zum Kapitaldeckungsverfahren in der Rentenversicherung auf die Kapitalmärkte 
 
2001 
27.  Heidorn, Thomas / Klein, Hans-Dieter / Siebrecht, Frank 
Economic Value Added zur Prognose der Performance europäischer Aktien 
 
2000 
26.  Cremers, Heinz 
Konvergenz der binomialen Optionspreismodelle gegen das Modell von Black/Scholes/Merton 
 
2000 
25.  Löchel, Horst 
Die ökonomischen Dimensionen der ‚New Economy‘ 
 
2000 
24.  Frank, Axel / Moormann, Jürgen 
Grenzen des Outsourcing: Eine Exploration am Beispiel von Direktbanken  
 
2000 
23.  Heidorn, Thomas / Schmidt, Peter / Seiler, Stefan 
Neue Möglichkeiten durch die Namensaktie 
 
2000 
22.  Böger, Andreas / Heidorn, Thomas / Graf Waldstein, Philipp 
Hybrides Kernkapital für Kreditinstitute 
 
2000 




20.  Wolf, Birgit 
Die Eigenmittelkonzeption des § 10 KWG 
 
2000 
19.  Cremers, Heinz / Robé, Sophie / Thiele, Dirk 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 129  53 
 




17.  Cremers, Heinz 
Value at Risk-Konzepte für Marktrisiken 
 
1999 
16.  Chevalier, Pierre / Heidorn, Thomas / Rütze, Merle 
Gründung einer deutschen Strombörse für Elektrizitätsderivate 
 
1999 




14.  Jochum, Eduard 
Hoshin Kanri / Management by Policy (MbP) 
 
1999 








11.  Moormann, Jürgen 
Terminologie und Glossar der Bankinformatik 
 
1999 
10.  Löchel, Horst 
The EMU and the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
 
1998 
09.  Löchel, Horst 
Die Geldpolitik im Währungsraum des Euro 
 
1998 
08.  Heidorn, Thomas / Hund, Jürgen 
Die Umstellung auf die Stückaktie für deutsche Aktiengesellschaften 
 
1998 
07.  Moormann, Jürgen 
Stand und Perspektiven der Informationsverarbeitung in Banken 
 
1998 
06.  Heidorn, Thomas / Schmidt, Wolfgang 
LIBOR in Arrears 
 
1998 
05.  Jahresbericht 1997  1998 
04.  Ecker, Thomas / Moormann, Jürgen 
Die Bank als Betreiberin einer elektronischen Shopping-Mall 
 
1997 
03.  Jahresbericht 1996  1997 
02.  Cremers, Heinz / Schwarz, Willi 
Interpolation of Discount Factors 
 
1996 
01.  Moormann, Jürgen 




FRANKFURT SCHOOL / HFB – WORKING PAPER SERIES  
CENTRE FOR PRACTICAL QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 
No.  Author/Title  Year 
20.  Reiswich, Dimitri / Wystup, Uwe 
FX Volatility Smile Construction 
 
2009 
19.  Reiswich, Dimitri / Tompkins, Robert 
Potential PCA Interpretation Problems for Volatility Smile Dynamics 
 
2009 
18.  Keller-Ressel, Martin / Kilin, Fiodar 
Forward-Start Options in the Barndorff-Nielsen-Shephard Model 
 
2008 
17.  Griebsch, Susanne / Wystup, Uwe 
On the Valuation of Fader and Discrete Barrier Options in Heston’s Stochastic Volatility Model 
 
2008 
16.  Veiga, Carlos / Wystup, Uwe 
Closed Formula for Options with Discrete Dividends and its Derivatives 
 
2008 
15.  Packham, Natalie / Schmidt, Wolfgang 
Latin hypercube sampling with dependence and applications in finance 
 
2008 
14.  Hakala, Jürgen / Wystup, Uwe 
FX Basket Options 
 
2008 
13.  Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe 
Vergleich von Anlagestrategien bei Riesterrenten ohne Berücksichtigung von Gebühren. Eine Simulationsstudie zur 
Verteilung der Renditen 
 
2008          
54 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 129 
 
12.  Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe 
Riesterrente im Vergleich. Eine Simulationsstudie zur Verteilung der Renditen 
 
2008 




10.  Wystup, Uwe 
Foreign Exchange Quanto Options 
 
2008 
09.  Wystup, Uwe 
Foreign Exchange Symmetries 
 
2008 
08.  Becker, Christoph / Wystup, Uwe 
Was kostet eine Garantie? Ein statistischer Vergleich der Rendite von langfristigen Anlagen 
 
2008 
07.  Schmidt, Wolfgang 
Default Swaps and Hedging Credit Baskets 
 
2007 
06.  Kilin, Fiodor 
Accelerating the Calibration of Stochastic Volatility Models 
 
2007 
05.  Griebsch, Susanne/ Kühn, Christoph / Wystup, Uwe 
Instalment Options: A Closed-Form Solution and the Limiting Case 
 
2007 
04.  Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M. 
Interest Rate Convexity and the Volatility Smile 
 
2006 
03.  Becker, Christoph/ Wystup, Uwe  
On the Cost of Delayed Currency Fixing 
 
2005 
02.  Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M.  
Cross currency swap valuation 
 
2004 
01.  Wallner, Christian / Wystup, Uwe 




HFB – SONDERARBEITSBERICHTE DER HFB - BUSINESS SCHOOL OF FINANCE & MANAGEMENT  
No.  Author/Title  Year 
01.  Nicole Kahmer / Jürgen Moormann 
Studie zur Ausrichtung von Banken an Kundenprozessen am Beispiel des Internet 






Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 






Printed edition: € 25.00 + € 2.50 shipping 
 
Download: 
Working Paper: http://www.frankfurt-school.de/content/de/research/Publications/list_of_publication0.html 
CPQF: http://www.frankfurt-school.de/content/de/research/quantitative_Finance/research_publications.html 
 
Order address / contact 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Sonnemannstr. 9 – 11  ￿  D – 60314 Frankfurt/M.  ￿  Germany 
Phone: +49 (0) 69 154 008 – 734  ￿  Fax: +49 (0) 69 154 008 – 728 
eMail: m.biemer@frankfurt-school.de 
Further information about Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
may be obtained at: http://www.frankfurt-school.de 
 